Constructive Logics Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and Typed Lambda-Calculi by Gallier, Jean H
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Technical Reports (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science 
October 1991 
Constructive Logics Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and Typed 
Lambda-Calculi 
Jean H. Gallier 
University of Pennsylvania, jean@cis.upenn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports 
Recommended Citation 
Jean H. Gallier, "Constructive Logics Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and Typed Lambda-Calculi", . 
October 1991. 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-CIS-91-74. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/410 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Constructive Logics Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and Typed Lambda-
Calculi 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of material dealing with constructive logic, typed λ-
calculi, and linear logic. The emergence in the past ten years of a coherent field of research often named 
"logic and computation" has had two major (and related) effects: firstly, it has rocked vigorously the world 
of mathematical logic; secondly, it has created a new computer science discipline, which spans from 
what is traditionally called theory of computation, to programming language design. Remarkably, this new 
body of work relies heavily on some "old" concepts found in mathematical logic, like natural deduction, 
sequent calculus, and λ-calculus (but often viewed in a different light), and also on some newer concepts. 
Thus, it may be quite a challenge to become initiated to this new body of work (but the situation is 
improving, there are now some excellent texts on this subject matter). This paper attempts to provide a 
coherent and hopefully "gentle" initiation to this new body of work. We have attempted to cover the basic 
material on natural deduction, sequent calculus, and typed λ-calculus, but also to provide an introduction 
to Girard's linear logic, one of the most exciting developments in logic these past five years. The first part 
of these notes gives an exposition of background material (with the exception of the Girard-translation of 
classical logic into intuitionistic logic, which is new). The second part is devoted to linear logic and proof 
nets. 
Comments 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-
CIS-91-74. 
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/410 
68E9-POT6T Vd 'e!qdlap~l~~d 
eruen~dsuuad jo dq~s~an 
a~~aps agddv pue %u!~aau12u3 jo ~ooq~s 
ax.~aps uo~qern~oju~ pt?~apduro3 jo ~uaurq~~daa 
Constructive Logics. Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and 
Typed A-Calculi 
Jean Gallier* 
Department of Computer and Information Science 
University of Pennsylvania 
200 South 33rd St. 
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA 
e-mail: jeanQsau1. c i s .  upenn. edu 
October 22, 1992 
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of material dealing with constructive 
logic, typed A-calculi, and linear logic. The emergence in the past ten years of a coherent field of 
research often named "logic and computation" has had two major (and related) effects: firstly, it has 
rocked vigorously the world of mathematical logic; secondly, it has created a new computer science 
discipline, which spans from what is traditionally called theory of computation, to programming 
language design. Remarkably, this new body of work relies heavily on some "old" concepts found 
in mathematical logic, like natural deduction, sequent calculus, and A-calculus (but often viewed 
in a different light), and also on some newer concepts. Thus, it may be quite a challenge to become 
initiated to  this new body of work (but the situation is improving, there are now some excellent 
texts on this subject matter). This paper attempts to provide a coherent and hopefully "gentle" 
initiation to this new body of work. We have attempted to cover the basic material on natural 
deduction, sequent calculus, and typed A-calculus, but also to provide an introduction to  Girard's 
linear logic, one of the most exciting developments in logic these past six years. The first part of 
these notes gives an exposition of background material (with some exceptions, such as "contraction- 
free" systems for intuitionistic propositional logic and the Girard-translation of classical logic into 
intuitionistic logic, which is new). The second part is devoted to  more current topics such as linear 
logic, proof nets, the geometry of interaction, and unified systems of logic (LU).  
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of material dealing with constructive logics, 
typed A-calculi, and linear logic. During the last fifteen years, a significant amount of research 
in the areas of programming language theory, automated deduction, and more generally logic and 
computation, has relied heavily on concepts and results found in the fields of constructive logics 
and typed A-calculi. However, there are very few comprehensive and introductory presentations of 
constructive logics and typed A-calculi for noninitiated researchers, and many people find it quite 
frustrating to become acquainted to this type of research. Our motivation in writing this paper is 
to  help fill this gap. We have attempted to cover the basic material on natural deduction, sequent 
calculus, and typed A-calculus, but also to provide an introduction to  Girard's linear logic [12], one 
of the most exciting developments in logic these past six years. As a consequence, we discovered 
that the amount of background material necessary for a good understanding of linear logic was 
quite extensive, and we found it convenient to  break this paper into two parts. The first part gives 
an exposition of background material (with some exceptions, such as "contraction-free" systems 
for intuitionistic propositional logic and the Girard-translation of classical logic into intuitionistic 
logic, which is new [14]). The second part is devoted to more current topics such as linear logic, 
proof nets, the geometry of interaction, and unified systems of logic (LU). 
In our presentation of background material, we have tried to motivate the introduction of 
various concepts by showing that they are indispensable to achieve certain natural goals. For 
pedagogical reasons, it seems that it is best to begin with proof systems in natural deduction style 
(originally due to Gentzen [8] and thoroughly investigated by Prawitz [23] in the sixties). This 
way, it is fairly natural to introduce the distinction between intuitionistic and classical logic. By 
adopting a description of natural deduction in terms of judgements, as opposed to the tagged 
trees used by Gentzen and Prawitz, we are also led quite naturally to the encoding of proofs as 
certain typed A-terms, and to the correspondence between proof normalization and P-conversion 
(the Curry/Howard isomorphism [16]). Sequent calculi can be motivated by the desire to  obtain 
more "symmetric" systems, but also systems in which proof search is easier to  perform (due to 
the subformula property). At first, the cut rule is totally unnecessary and even undesirable, since 
we are trying to design systems as deterministic as possible. We then show how every proof in 
the sequent calculus (G;) can be converted into a natural deduction proof (in N;). In order to 
provide a transformation in the other direction, we introduce the cut rule. But then, we observe 
that there is a mismatch, since we have a transformation Af: G; -t Ni on cut-free proofs, whereas 
6: Ni i Grt maps to proofs possibly with cuts. The mismatch is resolved by Gentzen's fundamental 
cut elimination theorem, which in turn singles out the crucial role played by the contraction rule. 
Indeed, the contraction rule plays a crucial role in the proof of the cut elimination theorem, and 
furthermore it cannot be dispensed with in traditional systems for intuitionistic logic (however, 
in the case of intuitionistic propositional logic, it is possible to design contraction-free systems, 
see section 9 for details). We are thus setting the stage for linear logic, in which contraction (and 
weakening) are dealt with in a very subtle way. We then investigate a number of sequent calculi that 
allow us to prove the decidability of provability in propositional classical logic and in propositional 
intuitionistic logic. In particular, we discuss some "contraction-free" systems for intuitionistic 
propositional logic for which proof search always terminates. Such systems were discovered in 
the early fifties by Vorob'ev [35, 361. Interest in such systems has been revived recently due to 
some work in automated theorem proving by Dyckhoff [5], on the embedding of intuitionistic logic 
into linear logic by Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar [20], and on the complexity of cut-elimination 
by Hudelmaier [17]. The cut elimination theorem is proved in full for the Gentzen system CK: 
using Tait's induction measure [29] and some twists due to Girard [13]. We conclude with a fairly 
extensive discussion of the reduction of classical logic to  intuitionistic logic. Besides the standard 
translations due to  Godel, Gentzen, and Kolmogorov, we present an improved translation due to  
Girard [14] (based on the notion of polarity of a formula). 
In writing this paper, we tried to uncover some of the intuitions that may either have been 
lost or obscured in advanced papers on the subject, but we have also tried to  present relatively 
sophisticated material, because this is more exciting for the reader. Thus, we have assumed that 
the reader has a certain familiarity with logic and the lambda calculus. If the reader does not 
feel sufficiently comfortable with these topics, we suggest consulting Girard, Lafont, Taylor [9] or 
Gallier [6] for background on logic, and Barendregt [2], Hindley and Seldin [15], or Krivine [I91 for 
background on the lambda calculus. For an in-depth study of constructivism in mathematics, we 
highly recommend Troelstra and van Dalen [32]. 
2 Natural Deduction, Simply-Typed X-Calculus 
We first consider a syntactic variant of the natural deduction system for implicational propositions 
due to Gentzen [a] and Prawitz [23]. 
In the natural deduction system of Gentzen and Prawitz, a deduction consists in deriving 
a proposition from a finite number of packets of assumptions, using some predefined inference 
rules. Technically, packets are multisets of propositions. During the course of a deduction, certain 
packets of assumptions can be "closed", or "discharged". A proof is a deduction such that all the 
assumptions have been discharged. In order to formalize the concept of a deduction, one faces the 
problem of describing rigorously the process of discharging packets of assumptions. The difficulty 
is that one is allowed to discharge any number of occurrences of the same proposition in a single 
step, and this requires some form of tagging mechanism. At least two forms of tagging techniques 
have been used. 
r The first one, used by Gentzen and Prawitz, consists in viewing a deduction as a tree whose 
nodes are labeled with propositions (for a lucid presentation, see van Dalen [34]). One is allowed 
to tag any set of occurrences of some proposition with a natural number, which also tags the 
inference that triggers the simultaneous discharge of all the occurrences tagged by that number. 
The second solution consists in keeping a record of all undischarged assumptions at  every stage 
of the deduction. Thus, a deduction is a tree whose nodes are labeled with expressions of the 
form I? F A, called sequents, where A is a proposition, and r is a record of all undischarged 
assumptions at  the stage of the deduction associated with this node. 
Although the first solution is perhaps more natural from a human's point of view and more 
economical, the second one is mathematically easier to handle. In the sequel, we adopt the second 
solution. It is convenient to tag packets of assumptions with labels, in order to discharge the 
propositions in these packets in a single step. We use variables for the labels, and a packet labeled 
with x consisting of occurrences of the proposition A is written as x: A. Thus, in a sequent I' I- A, 
the expression I' is any finite set of the form xl: A1,. . . , x,: A,, where the x; are pairwise distinct 
(but the A; need not be distinct). Given I? = xl : A1, . . . , x,: A,, the notation I', x: A is only well 
defined when x # xi for all i, 1 5 i 5 m, in which case it denotes the set $1: Al, . . . , z,: A,, x: A. 
We have the following axioms and inference rules. 
Definition 2.1 The axioms and inference rules of the system N z  (implicational logic) are listed 
below: 
I ' ,x :Ae A 
In an application of the rule (3-intro), we say that the proposition A which appears as a 
hypothesis of the deduction is discharged (or closed).' It is important to note that the ability to 
label packets consisting of occurrences of the same proposition with different labels is essential, 
in order to be able to have control over which groups of packets of assumptions are discharged 
simultaneously. Equivalently, we could avoid tagging packets of assumptions with variables if 
we assumed that in a sequent I' I- C ,  the expression I', also called a context, is a multiset of 
propositions. The following two examples illustrate this point. 
Example 2.2 Let 
r = x : A >  ( B > C ) , y : A >  B,z:A. 
i- (A 3 ( B  3 C)) 3 ((A 3 B)  3 (A 3 C)) 
In the above example, two occurrences of A are discharged simultaneously. Compare with the 
example below where these occurrences are discharged in two separate steps. 
Example 2.3 Let 
I' = x: A > ( B  3 C), y: A 3 B, 21: A, ZZ: A. 
'In this system, the packet of assumptions A is always discharged. This is not so in Prawitz's system (as presented 
for example in van Dalen [34]), but we also feel that this is a slightly confusing aspect of Prawitz's system. 
I- A  3 ((A 3 ( B  3 C ) )  3 ( ( A  3 B )  3 ( A  3 c))) 
For the sake of comparison, we show what these two natural deductions look like in the system 
of Gentzen and Prawitz, where packets of assumptions discharged in the same inference are tagged 
with a natural number. Example 2.2 corresponds to the following tree: 
Example 2.4 
( A  > (B  3 c)j3 A' ( A  3 B ) ~  A' 
B 3 C  B  
C  - 1 
A 3 C  
2 
( A  3 B )  3 ( A  3 C )  
3 
(A 3 ( B  3 C ) )  3 ( ( A  3 B )  3 ( A  3 C ) )  
and Example 2.3 to the following tree: 
Example 2.5 
( A  3 ( B  3 C j )  3 ( ( A  3 B )  3 ( A  3 C ) )  
It is clear that a context (the r in a sequent I' a- A )  is used to tag packets of assumptions and 
to record the time a t  which they are discharged. From now on, we stick to the presentation of 
natural deduction using sequents. 
Proofs may contain redundancies, for example when an elimination immediately follows an 
introduction, as in the following example in which Dl denotes a deduction with conclusion I?, x: A I- 
B and V2 denotes a deduction with conclusion I' I- A. 
Intuitively, it should be possible to  construct a deduction for r I- B from the two deductions 
Dl and D2 without using at  all the hypothesis x: A. This is indeed the case. If we look closely at  
the deduction Dl, from the shape of the inference rules, assumptions are never created, and the 
leaves must be labeled with expressions of the form I", A, x: A, y: C I- C or r ,  A, x: A I- A, where 
y + x and either I' = I" or r = r ' ,  y: C. We can form a new deduction for I' I- B as follows: in 
Dl, wherever a leaf of the form I?, A, x: A I- A occurs, replace it by the deduction obtained from 
V2 by adding A to  the premise of each sequent in 'D2. Actually, one should be careful to  first make 
a fresh copy of V2 by renaming all the variables so that clashes with variables in Dl are avoided. 
Finally, delete the assumption x: A from the premise of every sequent in the resulting proof. The 
resulting deduction is obtained by a kind of substitution and may be denoted as V1[V2/x], with 
some minor abuse of notation. Note that the assumptions x: A occurring in the leaves of the form 
I", A, x: A, y: C I- C were never used anyway. This illustrates the fact that not all assumptions are 
necessarily used. This will not be the case in linear logic [12]. Also, the same assumption may 
be used more than once, as we can see in the (1-elim) rule. Again, this will not be the case in 
linear logic, where every assumption is used exactly once, unless specified otherwise by an explicit 
mechanism. The step which consists in transforming the above redundant proof figure into the 
deduction D1[V2/x] is called a reduction step or normalization step. 
We now show that the simply-typed A-calculus provides a natural notation for proofs in natural 
deduction, and that p-conversion corresponds naturally to proof normalization. The trick is to  
annotate inference rules with terms corresponding to the deductions being built, by placing these 
terms on the righthand side of the sequent, so that the conclusion of a sequent appears t o  be 
the "type of its proof". This way, inference rules have a reading as "type-checking rules". This 
discovery due to  Curry and Howard is known as the Curry/Howard isomorphism, or formulae- 
as-types principle [16]. An early occurrence of this correspondence can be found in Curry and 
Feys [3] (1958), Chapter 9E, pages 312-315. Furthermore, and this is the deepest aspect of the 
Curry/Howard isomorphism, proof normalization corresponds to term reduction in the A-calculus 
associated with the proof system. 
Definition 2.6 The type-checking rules of the A-calculus A' (simply-typed A-calculus) are listed 
below: 
I ' ,x:AI- M: B 
(abstraction) r (AX: A. M ) :  A 3 B 
T i - M : A I B  r k N : A  
( application) 
I' I- (MN):  B 
Now, sequents are of the form r I- M: A, where M is a simply-typed X-term representing a 
deduction of A from the assumptions in I?. Such sequents are also called judgements, and I' is 
called a type assignment or context. 
The example of redundancy is now written as follows: 
Now, Dl is incorporated in the deduction as the term M, and D2 is incorporated in the deduction 
as the term N.  The great bonus of this representation is that D1[D2/x] corresponds to  M[N/x], 
the result of performing a P-reduction step on (Ax: A. M ) N .  
Example 2.7 
y: P I- Xz: Q. y: (Q > P )  
I- (Ax: ( P  > (Q 3 P)). Xu: P. u)Xy: P. XZ: Q. y: (P > P )  
The term (Ax: ( P  > (Q > P)) .  Xu: P. u)Xy: P. XZ: Q. y reduces to  Xu: P. u, which is indeed the 
term representation of the natural deduction proof 
Thus, the simply-typed X-calculus arises as a natural way to  encode natural deduction proofs, 
and P-reduction corresponds to proof normalization. The correspondence between proof normaliza- 
tion and term reduction is the deepest and most fruitful aspect of the Curry/Howard isomorphism. 
Indeed, using this correspondence, results about the simply-typed X-calculus can be translated into 
the framework of natural deduction proofs, a very nice property. On the other hand, one should 
not be too dogmatic (or naive) about the Curry/Howard isomorphism and make it  into some kind 
of supreme commandment (as we say in French, "prendre ses d6sirs pour des r6alitb7'). In the 
functional style of programming, X-reduction corresponds to parameter-passing, but more is going 
on, in particular recursion. Thus, although it is fruitful to view a program as a proof, the speci- 
fication of a program as the proposition proved by that proof, and the execution of a program as 
proof normalization (or cut elimination, but it is confusing to  say that, since in most cases we are 
dealing with a natural deduction system), it is abusive to  claim that this is what programming is 
all about. In fact, I believe that statements to  that effect are detrimental to  our field. There are 
plenty of smart people who are doing research in the theory of programming and programming lan- 
guage design, and such statements will only make them skeptical (at best). Programming cannot 
be reduced to  the Curry/Howard isomorphism. 
When we deal with the calculus A', rather than using 3,  we usually use +, and thus, the 
calculus is denoted as A'. In order to avoid ambiguities, the delimiter used to  separate the lefthand 
side from the righthand side of a judgement r t- M: A will be D, so that judgements are written as 
~ D M : A .  
Before moving on to  more fascinating topics, we cannot resist a brief digression on notation 
(at least, we will spare the reader the moralistic lecture that we have inflicted upon students over 
more than fourteen years!). Notation is supposed to  help us, but the trouble is that i t  can also be 
a handicap. This is because there is a very delicate balance between the explicit and the implicit. 
Our philosophy is that the number of symbols used should be minimized, and that notation should 
help remembering what things are, rather than force remembering what things are. The most 
important thing is that notation should be as unambiguous as possible. Furthermore, we should 
allow ourselves dropping certain symbols as long as no serious ambiguities arise, and we should 
avoid using symbols that already have a standard meaning, although this is nearly impossible. 
Lambda-abstraction and substitution are particularly spicy illustrations. For example, the 
notation Ax: O M  together with ( M  N )  for application is unambiguous. However, when we see the 
term (Ax: a M N ) ,  we have to  think a little (in fact, too much) to realize that this is indeed the 
application of Ax: a M  to  N ,  and not the abstraction Ax: a (MN) .  This is even worse if we look at 
the term Ax: a M N  where the parentheses have been dropped. So, we may consider introducing 
extra markers, just to help readability, although they are not strictly necessary. For example, we 
can add a dot between a and M: abstraction is then written as Ax: a. M. Similarly, universally 
quantified formulae are written as Vx: a.  A.  Now, Ax: a. M N  is a little better, but still requires an 
effort. Thus, we will add parentheses around the lambda abstraction and write (Ax: a. M)N.  Yes, 
we are using more symbols than we really need, but we feel that we have removed the potential 
confusion with Ax: a .  M N  (which should really be written as Ax: a . (MN)) .  Since we prefer avoiding 
subscripts or superscripts unless they are really necessary, we favor the notation Ax: a. M over the 
(slightly old-fashion) Ax". M (we do not find the economy of one symbol worth the superscript).2 
Now, let us present another choice of notation, a choice that we consider poor since it forces us 
t o  remember something rather than help us. In this choice, abstraction is written as [x: a ]M,  and 
universal quantification as (x: a)A. The problem is that the reader needs to remember which kind of 
bracket corresponds to  abstraction or to (universal) quantification. Since additional parentheses are 
usually added when applications arise, we find this choice quite confusing. The argument that this 
notation corresponds to some form of machine language is the worst that can be given. Humans are 
not machines, and thus should not be forced to read machine code! An interesting variation on the 
notations Ax: a. M and Vx: a.  A is A(x: a ) M  and V(x: a)A, which is quite defendable. Substitution 
is an even more controversial subject! Our view is the following. After all, a substitution is 
a function whose domain is a set of variables and which is the identity except on a finite set. 
Furthermore, substitutions can be composed. But beware: composition of substitutions is not 
function composition (indeed, a substitution p induces a homomorphism @, and the composition of 
two substitutions 9 and Il, is the function composition of @ and Il,, and not of 9 and 111). Thus, the 
'The notation Axu. M seems to appear mostly i n  systems where contexts are not used, but instead where i t  is 
assumed that  each variable has been preassigned a type. 
choice of notation for composition of substitutions has an influence on the notation for substitution. 
If we choose to  denote composition of substitution in the order cp ; +, then it  is more convenient t o  
denote the result of applying a substitution p to a term M as Mcp, or (M)cp, or as we prefer as M[cp]. 
Indeed, this way, M[p][$] is equal to M [ p  ; $1. Now, since a substitution is a function with domain 
a finite set of variables, it can be denoted as [xl H MI,.  . . , x, t, M,]. In retrospect, we regret not 
having adopted this notation. If this was the case, applying a substitution to  M would be denoted 
as M[xl H MI, .  . . , x, H M,]. Instead, we use the notation [tl/xl,. . . , t,/x,] which has been 
used for some time in automated theorem proving. Then, applying a substitution t o  M is denoted 
as M[tl / a l ,  . . . , t,/x,] (think for just a second of the horrible clash if this notation was used 
with [x: a ] M  for abstraction!). Other authors denote substitutions as [XI: = MI,.  . . , x,: = M,]. 
Personally, we would prefer switching to  [XI H MI, .  . . , x, w M,], because : = is also used for 
denoting a function f whose value at some argument x is redefined to  be a, as in f [x: = a] .  Finally, 
a word about sequents and judgements. To us, the turnstile symbol I- means provability. A sequent 
consists of two parts I' and A, and some separator is needed between them. In principle, anything 
can do, and if the arrow -, was not already used as a type-constructor, we would adopt the notation 
+ A.  Some authors denote sequents as r I- A. A problem then arises when we want to  say that 
a sequent is provable, since this is written as l- r t- A. The ideal is to  use symbols of different size 
for the two uses of I-. In fact, we noticed that Girard himself has designed his own I- which has a 
thicker but smaller (in height) foot: I-. Thus, we will use the "Girardian turnstile" I- in writing 
sequents as r I- A. Judgements have three parts, r, M ,  and a .  Our view is that r and M actually 
come together to form what we have called elsewhere a "declared term" (thinking of the context r 
as a declaration of the variables). Again we need a way to put together I' and M, and we use the 
symbol D, thus forming r D M. Then, a declared term may have a type a, and such a judgement 
is written as r D M: a. To say that a judgement is provable, we write I- r D M: a. We find this 
less confusing than the notation l- I' I- M: a ,  and this is why we favor r D M: a over r I- M: a 
(but some authors use D for the reduction relation! We use -). And please, avoid the notation 
I- r I- M E a ,  which we find terribly confusing and cruel to E. But we have indulged too long into 
this digression, and now back to more serious business. 
3 Adding Conjunct ion, Negation, and Disjunction 
First, we present the natural deduction systems, and then the corresponding extensions of the 
simply-typed A-calculus. As far as proof normalization is concerned, conjunction does not cause 
any problem, but as we will see, negation and disjunction are more problematic. In order to  
add negation, we add the new constant I (false) to  the language, and define negation 1 A  as an 
abbreviation for A >I. 
Definition 3.1 The axioms and inference rules of the system N,?'~'"'' (intuitionistic propositional 
logic) are listed below: 
r , x : A ~  A 
I ' t - A  I ' I -B  
(A-intro) rt- A A B  
r ~ -  A A B  rt- A A B  
(A-elim) ( A-elim) 
T E A  r t - B  
rI- A V B  I ' ,x :At -C r , y : B t - C  
(v-elivn) r t -c 
Since the rule ( I -e l im) is trivial (does nothing) when A = I ,  from now on, we will assume that 
A #I. Minimal propositional logic N2~"~"~' is obtained by dropping the (I-elim) rule. In order 
to  obtain the system of classical propositional logic, denoted JV,~~"~"~', we add t o  N,>J'jVyL the 
following inference rule corresponding to the principle of proof by contradiction (by-contra) (also 
called reductio ad absurdum). 
r, X: TA EI 
(by-contra) 
TI- A 
Several useful remarks should be made. 
(1) In classical propositional logic (hl,>~"~"~'), the rule 
r I-I 
(I-el im) 
I'I- A 
can be derived, since if we have a deduction of I' +I, then for any arbitrary A we have a deduction 
I', x: -1.4 t - 1 ,  and thus a deduction of r I- A by applying the (by-contra) rule. 
(2) The proposition A > 1 1 A  is derivable in N2*">"tL, but the reverse implication 7 - A  3 A is 
not derivable, even in ~ " A ' V " .  On the other hand, 1-A 3 A is derivable in N??"*"*'-: 
x: i i A ,  y: TA I-I 
(by-contra) 
x: 1 i A  I- A 
(3) Using the (by-contra) inference rule together with (1-elim) and (v-intro), we can prove 
1 A  V A (that is, (A > I )  V A). Let 
We have the following proof for ( A  > I )  V A in N,>~"~V~L: 
r I-1 
(by-contra) 
I- (A 3 1 )  v A 
As in (2), TA V A is not derivable in A(''A'V'L. The reader might wonder how one shows that 
- I T A  > A and -IA V A are not provable in In fact, this is not easy to  prove directly. One 
method is to  use the fact (given by theorem 3.4 and theorem 3.5) that every proof-term reduces 
to a unique normal form. Then, argue that if the above propositions have a proof in normal form, 
this leads to a contradiction. Another even simpler method is to  use cut-free Gentzen systems, to  
be discussed in sections 4, 8, and 9. 
The typed A-calculus corresponding to is given in the following definition. 
Definition 3.2 The typed A-calculus A'*X"-lL is defined by the following rules. 
with A # I ,  
r , x : A ~  M:  B 
(abstraction) 
I' D (Ax: A. M): A -+ B 
I 'DM:A-, B ~ D N : A  
( application) r D (MN) :  B 
I ' D M : A  ~ D N : B  
(pairing) 
r r > ( M , N ) : A x  B 
r r , M : A x  B I ' D M : A x  B 
(projection) (projection) r D nl(M): A I? D n a ( M ) :  B 
~ D M : A  ~ D M : B  
(injection) (injection) r D i n l (M) :  A + B D inr(M):  A + B 
r ~ f ' : A +  B I? ,X :ADM:C r , y : B D N : C  
(by-cases) r D case(P, Ax: A. M, Ay: B. N): C 
A syntactic variant of case(P,  Ax: A. M ,  Ay: B. N )  often found in the literature is 
c a s e  P of i n l ( x :  A) + M ) inr(y:  B )  =+ N,  
or even 
case  P of i n l ( x )  + M I i n r (y )  + N, 
and the (by-cases) rule can be written as 
I ' r , P : A + B  I ' , X : A D M : C  I ' , y : B o N : C  
( by-cases) r D ( case  P of in l (x :  A) + M I inr(y:  B) + N): C 
We also have the following reduction rules. 
Definition 3.3 The reduction rules of the system X ' ~ X ~ + ~ L  are listed below: 
(Ax: A.  M ) N  - M[N/x],  
n l ( (M,  N ) )  - M ,  
r2((M, N ) )  - N,  
c a s e ( i n l ( P ) ,  Ax: A. M ,  Xy: B.  N) - M[P/x] ,  or  
c a s e  i n l ( P )  of i n l ( x :  A) + M I inr(y:  B )  + N - M[P/x],  
case ( in r (P) ,  Ax: A. M ,  Xy: B. N )  - N[P/y],  or  
c a s e  i n r ( P )  of i n l ( x :  A) + M I inr (y:  B )  + N - N [P/y], 
VA-+B(M)N -+ VB(M),  
~ ~ ( v A x B ( M ) )  --+ VA(M),  
a 2 ( ~ ~ x ~ ( M ) )  - VB(M),  
c a s e ( ~ ~ + ~ ( P ) ,  Ax: A. M ,  Xy: B. N )  - v c ( P ) .  
Alternatively, as suggested by Ascdnder Sudrez, we could replace the rules for c a s e  by the rules 
c a s e ( i n l ( P ) ,  M ,  N )  - M P ,  
c a s e ( i n r ( P ) ,  M ,  N )  - N P ,  
c ~ s ~ ( v A + B ( ~ ) ,  M ,  N )  - VC(P) .  
A fundamental result about natural deduction is the fact that  every proof (term) reduces t o  a 
normal form, which is unique up t o  a-renaming. This result was first proved by Prawitz [24] for 
the system Ni >,A,V,1 
Theorem 3.4 [Church-Rosser property, Prawi tz (1971)] Reduction in A ' ~ X ~ + ~ L  (specified in Def- 
inition 3.3) is confluent. Equivalently, conversion in A ' ~ x ~ f ~ l  is Church-Rosser. 
A proof can be given by adapting the method of Tait and Martin-Lof [21] using a form of 
parallel reduction (see also Barendregt [2], Hindley and Seldin [15], or Stenlund [27]). 
Theorem 3.5 [Strong normalization property, Prawitz (1971)l Reduction in X'*X~+vL (as in Def- 
inition 3.3) is strongly normalizing. 
A proof can be given by adapting Tait's reducibility method [28], [30], as done in Girard [lo] 
(1971), [ll] (1972) (see also Gallier [7]). 
If one looks at  the rules of the systems N3J"'V7L (or X''X'+y'), one notices a number of un- 
pleasant features: 
(1) There is an asymmetry between the lefthand side and the righthand side of a sequent (or 
judgement): the righthand side must consist of a single formula, but the lefthand side may 
have any finite number of assumptions. This is typical of intuitionistic logic (and it is one 
of the major characteristics of its sequent-calculus formulations, see section 4) but it is also 
a defect. 
(2) Negation is very badly handled, only in an indirect fashion. 
(3) The (3-intro) rule and the (V-elim) rule are global rules requiring the discharge of assump- 
tions. 
(4) Worse of all, the (V-elim) rule contains the parasitic formula C which has nothing to do 
with the disjunction being eliminated. 
Finally, note that it is quite difficult to search for proofs in such a system. Gentzen's sequent 
systems remedy some of these problems. 
4 Gentzen's Sequent Calculi 
The main idea is that now, a sequent r I- A consists of two finite multisets r and A of formulae, and 
that rather than having introduction and elimination rules, we have rules introducing a connective 
on the left or on the right of a sequent. A first version of such a system for classical propositional 
logic is given next. In these rules and A stand for possibly empty finite multisets of propositions. 
Definition 4.1 The axioms and inference rules of the system G ~ ~ " ~ " ~ '  for classical propositional 
logic are given below. 
A , r t -  4 , A  
A , A , ~ I -  A r~ A , A , A  
(contrac: left) (contrac: right) 
A , ~ F  A rt- A,A 
A,B,I ' t-  A r p A , A  r t - A , B  
(A: left) (A: right) 
A A  B , ~ I -  A r ~ -  A , A A  B 
A , ~ I -  A B , ~ F  A I'E A , A , B  
(v: left) (v: right) 
A V B , ~ F A  FI- A , A v  B 
I?I- A ,A  B , T +  4 A , ~ F  4 , B  
( 3 :  left) (2 :  right) 
A 3 B , ~ I -  A ~ E A , A > B  
l 7 ~  A,A A,I't- A 
(1:  left) (1: right) 
TA, r b A rt- A , i A  
Note the perfect symmetry of the left and right rules. If one wants to  deal with the extended 
language containing also I, one needs to add the axiom 
One might be puzzled and even concerned about the presence of the contraction rule. Indeed, 
one might wonder whether the presence of this rule will not cause provability to  be undecidable. 
This would certainly be quite bad, since we are only dealing with propositions! Fortunately, it can 
be shown that the contraction rule is redundant for classical propositional logic (see section 8). 
But then, why include it in the first place? The main reason is that i t  cannot be dispensed with in 
traditional systems for intuitionistic logic, or in the case of quantified formulae (however, in the case 
of propositional intuitionistic logic, it is possible to  formulate contraction-free systems which easily 
yield the decidability of provability, see section 9). Since we would like to  view intuitionistic logic 
as a subsystem of classical logic, we cannot eliminate the contraction rule from the presentation of 
classical systems. Another important reason is that the contraction rule plays an important role 
in cut elimination. Although it is possible to  hide it by dealing with sequents viewed as pairs of 
sets rather than multisets, we prefer to deal with it explicitly. Finally, the contraction rule plays 
a crucial role in linear logic, and in the understanding of the correspondence between proofs and 
computations, in particular strict versus lazy evaluation (see Abramsky [I]). 
In order to  obtain a system for intuitionistic logic, we restrict the righthand side of a sequent 
to  consist of at most one formula. We also modify the (3: left) rule and the (V: right) rule which 
splits into two rules. The (contrac: right) rule disappears, and it is also necessary t o  add a rule of 
weakening on the right, to  mimic the (I-elim) rule. 
Definition 4.2 The axioms and inference rules of the system G > ' ~ ' " ' ~  for intuitionistic proposi- 
tional logic are given below. 
A, r I -  A 
r I- 
(weakening: right) rI- A 
A , A , r k  A 
(contrac: left) 
A , r I -  A 
A , B , ~ I -  A r ~ - A  r ~ - B  
(A: left) (A: right) 
A A B , ~ I -  A ~ I - A A B  
A , r k  A B , ~ I -  A 
(v: left) 
A v B . r t -  A 
I?I- A I?I-B 
(v: right) (v: right) 
I?I- A V B  I?I- A V B  
rl- A B , ~ I -  A A , r b  B 
( 3 :  left) ( 3 :  right) 
A > B , ~ F  A r k A > B  
r b  A A, r I- 
(7 :  left) (7:  right) 
TA, r I- r k  TA 
In the above rules, A contains at  most one formula. If one wants to  deal with the extended 
language containing also I, one simply needs to add the axiom 
where again, A contains at  most one formula. If we choose the language restricted to  formulae over 
A, 3, V, and I, then negation 1 A  is viewed as an abbreviation for A 31. Such a system can be 
simplified a little bit if we observe that the axiom I, I' I- A implies that the rule 
r I-I 
with A #I is derivable. Indeed, assume that we have the axiom 1, r I- A. If 1-1 is provable, 
inspection of the inference rules shows that the proof must contain some leaf nodes of the form 
r' I-I. Since these leaves are axioms, we must have I E r', in which case I" I- A is also an axiom. 
A simple induction shows that we obtain a proof of I' I- A by replacing all occurrences of I on the 
righthand side of b by A.  We can also prove that the converse almost holds. Since I, I' I-l is an 
axiom, using the rule 
1 , r I - 1  
I , r t -  A 
we see that I ,  r I- A is provable. The reason why this is not exactly the converse is that I, I' I- is 
not provable in this system. This suggests to consider sequents of the form I' I- A where A consists 
exactly of a single formula. In this case, the axiom I, I' I- A is equivalent to the rule 
r I-L 
(I: right) rt- A 
(with A #I). We have the following system. 
Definition 4.3 The axioms and inference rules of the system G>'~'"' '  for intuitionistic proposi- 
tional logic are given below. 
A,l?t- A 
rI-1 
( I :  right) rt- A 
with A #I, 
A , A , r b  C 
(contrac: left) 
A , r i -  C 
A, B, r t- C  FA I'I-B 
(A: left) (A:  right) 
AA B,I't- C r t - A A B  
A,I'I- C B , ~ F  C 
(V: le f t )  
AVB, I ' I -  C 
rt- A r r - B  
(V: right) ( v :  right) 
l ? ~ -  A V B  I ' F A V B  
rI- A B,I'I- C A,I't- B 
(3:  lef t)  (3: right) 
A > B , ~ I - C  I ' I -A>B 
There is a close relationship between the natural deduction system q''"'V'L and the Gentzen 
In fact, there is a procedure N for translating every proof in G?'"'~" into a system 6; 
deduction in ~3'"'"". The procedure N has the remarkable property that N(II)  is a deduction in 
normal form for every proof II. Since there are deductions in 4""'V" that are not in normal form, 
the function N is not surjective. The situation can be repaired by adding a new rule t o  G>'"~",  
the cut rule. Then, there is a procedure N mapping every proof in G,?'"'~" t o  a deduction in 
and a procedure G mapping every deduction in N,>'"'V" to  a proof in G?'"'~"'"~. 
In order to  close the loop, we would need to  show that every proof in G ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  can be 
>,A,V,' transformed into a proof in Gi , that is, a cut-free proof. It is an extremely interesting 
and deep fact that the system G ~ ' " ' ~ " ' ~ " ~  and the system G?'"'~" are indeed equivalent. This 
fundamental result known as the cut elimination theorem was first proved by Gentzen in 1935 [a]. 
The proof actually gives an algorithm for converting a proof with cuts into a cut-free proof. The 
main difficulty is t o  prove that this algorithm terminates. Gentzen used a fairly complex induction 
measure which was later simplified by Tait [29]. 
The contraction rule plays a crucial role in the proof of this theorem, and it is therefore natural 
to believe that this rule cannot be dispensed with. This is indeed true for the intuitionistic system 
G > ' ~ ' ~ "  (but it can be dispensed with in the classical system G ~ ~ A ~ V ~ ' ) .  If we delete the contraction 
rule from the system G?'"'~" (or G : ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ) ,  certain formulae are no longer provable. For example, 
I- 17(P V T P )  is provable in G ? ' ~ ' ~ " ,  but it is impossible to  build a cut-free proof for it without 
using (contrac: left). Indeed, the only way to build a cut-free proof for I- l l ( P  V 1 P )  without 
using (contrac: left) is to proceed as follows: 
Since the only rules that could yield a cut-free proof of I- P V 1P are the (v: right) rules and 
neither I- P nor I- 1P is provable, it is clear that there is no cut-free proof of I- P V 1P. 
However, I- l l ( P  V T P )  is provable in G > ' ~ ' ~ " ,  as shown by the following proof (the same 
example can be worked out in G>'"'~"): 
Example 4.4 
PI -P  
P I - P V l P  
l ( P  v l P ) ,  l ( P  v 1 P )  I- 
(contrac: left) 
l ( P V  1 P ) I -  
Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate a cut-free system G I C ? ' " ' ~ ' ~  which is equivalent to  
~ 3 , " ' ~ "  (see section 8). Such a system due to  Kleene [18] has no contraction rule, and the premise 
of every sequent can be interpreted as a set as opposed to a multiset (furthermore, in the case of 
intuitionistic propositional logic, it is possible to design contraction-free systems which yield easily 
the decidability of provability, see section 9 for details). 
5 Definition of the Transformation N from Gi to Ni 
The purpose of this section is to give a procedure N mapping every proof in G""'~'' to a deduction 
in q''A'V". The procedure N is defined by induction on the structure of proof trees and requires 
some preliminary definitions. 
Definition 5.1 A proof tree 11 in G>'" '~" with root node I' I- C is denoted as 
and similarly a deduction V in 4"A'V'L with root node r I- C is denoted as 
A proof tree II whose last inference is 
r I - B  
A t - D  
is denoted as 
where TI1 is the immediate subproof of II whose root is r I- B, and a proof tree 11 whose last 
inference is 
is denoted as 
where 111 and IIz are the immediate subproofs of II whose roots are r I- B and r I- C ,  respectively. 
A similar notation applies to deductions. 
Given a proof tree ll with root node r I- C, 
N yields a deduction n/(II) of C from the set of assumptions r+, 
where I'f is obtained from the multiset r. However, one has to exercise some care in defining r+ 
so that JV is indeed a function. This can be achieved as follows. We can assume that we have a 
fixed total order 5 ,  on the set of all propositions so that they can be enumerated as PI, P2, . . ., 
and a fixed total order 5,  on the set of all variables so that they can be enumerated as XI, x2,. . .. 
Definition 5.2 Given a multiset = A1,. . .,A,, since {A1,. . ., A,) = {Pi,, . .. ,Pin) where 
Pi, Sp Piz Sp . . . - < p  Pin (where PI, Pz, . . ., is the enumeration of all propositions and where 
i .  - i .  ,+I is possible since r is a multiset), we define r+ as the set I'+ = xl: P;,, . . . , x,: Pin. 
We will also need the following concepts and notation. 
Definition 5.3 Given a deduction 
the deduction obtained by adding the additional assumptions A to the lefthand side of every sequent 
of 2) is denoted as A + V, and it is only well defined provided that dom(rf)  n dom(A) = 0 for every 
sequent l?' I- A occurring in v . ~  Similarly, given a sequential proof 
we define the proof A + II by adding A to the lefthand side of every sequent of 11, and we define 
the proof II + O by adding O to the righthand side of every sequent of ll. 
We also need a systematic way of renaming the variables in a deduction. 
Definition 5.4  Given a deduction V with root node A I- C the deduction D' obtained from 2) by 
rectification is defined inductively as follows: 
Given a context A = yl : A1, . . . , y, : A,, define the total order < on A as follows: 
Ai <p Aj, or yi:Ai < yj:Aj iff 
A i = A j  and y i< ,y j .  
3 ~ i ~ ~ ~  a context r = 2,: A 1 , .  . . , x,: A n ,  we let d o m ( r )  = ('1, . .  . s x n }  
The order < on yl : A1, . . . , y,: A, defines the permutation a such that 
If 'D consists of the single node y l :  A1,. . . , y,: A, I- C ,  let A' = X I :  A+), . . . , x,: A,(,), and define 
V' as A' I- C. The permutation a induces a bijection between {x l , .  . . , x,) and { y l ,  . . . , y,}, 
namely xi I+ yo(;). 
If 'D is of the form 
by induction, we have the rectified deduction 
where xj corresponds to yl in the bijection between { x l , .  . .,x,) and I y l , .  .. , y,} (in fact, j = 
a-'(1) since A1 = A,(j)). Then, apply the substitution [ x , / x ~ ,  x j / ~ j + ~ ,  . . . x,-~/x,] to  the 
deduction V;, and form the deduction 
A similar construction applies to  the rule (V-elim) and is left as an exercise t o  the reader. The 
other inference rules do not modify the lefthand side of sequents, and ID' is obtained by rectifying 
the immediate subtree(s) of V. 
Note that for any deduction D with root node y l :  Al, .. . , y,: A, I- C, the rectified deduction 2)' 
has for its root node the sequent I'+ I- C ,  where I'+ is obtained from the multiset I' = A1,. . . ,A ,  
as in Definition 5.2. 
The procedure JV is defined by induction on the structure of the proof tree II. 
r An axiom F, A I- A is mapped to  the deduction (I', A)+ I- A. 
r A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
I A proof I1 of the form 
is mapped to  a deduction as follows. First map Ill to  the deduction N(I I l )  
Next, replace every occurrence of "x: A, y: A" in N(I I I )  by " z :  A" where z is a new variable not 
occurring in N(I l l ) ,  and finally rectify the resulting tree. 
Before we proceed any further, a sticky point needs to be clarified regarding the context 
x: A, y: A,r*. In the above transformation, the multiset A, A, r is mapped to  (A, A, I?)+ under 
the operation +. Unfortunately, we cannot assume in general that (A, A,  r ) +  = x: A, y: A, I?+, be- 
cause in the enumeration of the propositions forming the multiset A, A, r ,  the two occurrences of 
A may not appear as the last two elements. Thus, (A, A, r)+ is of the form x: A, y: A , r*  for some 
r* not necessarily equal to I?+. This point being cleared up, we will use the notation r* in the rest 
of the construction without any further comments. 
I A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
I A proof II of the form 
A A  B,I?I- C 
is mapped t o  a deduction obtained as follows. First, map Ill to N(II1) 
Next, replace every leaf of the form x: A, y: B, A , r *  I- A in N(II1) by the subtree 
z : A A B , A , r * e  A A B  
z:AA B , A , r * k  A 
and every leaf of the form x: A, y: B, A, I?* I- B in N(II1) by the subtree 
where z is new, replace "x: A, y: B" by "2: A A B" in every antecedent of the resulting deduction, 
and rectify this last tree. 
A proof TI of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
which is then rectified. 
A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  a deduction as follows. First map TI1 and 112 to deductions N(II1) 
and N ( I I 2 )  
Modify N ( n l )  so that it becomes a deduction N(n1)' with conclusion r* I- A. 
Next, form the deduction V 
and modify N(n2)  as follows: replace every leaf of the form x:  B, A, r* I- B by the deduction 
which itself is obtained from A + 'D by replacing " x :  B" by " z :  A 5) B" in the lefthand side of every 
sequent. Finally, rectify this last deduction. 
A proof I I  of the form 
is mapped to the deduction 
and similarly for the other case of the ( v :  right) rule. 
A proof II of the form 
is mapped to a deduction as follows. First map 111 and r12 to deductions n/(II1) 
and N(II2) 
Since l?; and ra may differ, construct deductions N(II1)' and N(n2)' with conclusions x:  A, I?* I- C 
and y: B,  I'* I- C for the same I?*. Next, form the deduction 
and rectify this last tree. 
This concludes the definition of the procedure N.  Note that the contraction rule can be stated 
in the system of natural deduction as follows: 
where z is a new variable. The following remarkable property of N is easily shown. 
Lemma 5.5 [Gentzen (1935), Prawitz (1965)) For ewry proof II in G:'"'~", N(n) i s  o deduction 
in normal form (in %''A'V"). 
Since there are deductions in q"A'V" that are not in normal form, the function N is not 
surjective. It is interesting to observe that the function N is not injective either. What happens 
is that G " ~ ' ~ ~ '  is more sequential than J V ? ~ ' ~ ' ' ,  in the sense that the order of application of 
inferences is strictly recorded. Hence, two proofs in G>'~ '""  of the same sequent may differ for 
bureaucratic reasons: independent inferences are applied in different orders. In N,>'"'"'I, these 
differences disappear. The following example illustrates this point. The sequent I- ( P  A P') > 
( (Q  A Q') 1 ( P  A Q ) )  has the following two sequential proofs 
P A P' i- (Q A Q')  3 ( P  A Q )  
and 
P,P1,Q A Q ' E  P A Q  
P A P' I- ( Q  A Q')  3 ( P  A Q )  
i- ( P  A P') 3 ( ( Q  A Q')  3 ( P A  Q ) )  
Both proofs are mapped to the deduction 
X: P A P1,y:Q AQ'I- PAP' x : P A P t , y : Q  AQ'F  Q AQ'  
x : P A P ' , ~ : Q A Q ' I -  P x : P A P ' , ~ : Q A Q ' I -  Q 
x : P A P ' , ~ : Q A Q ' I -  P A Q  
6 Definition of the Transformation G from Ni to Gi 
We now show that if we add a new rule, the cut rule, to  the system G?'"'~", then we can define a 
procedure 6 mapping every deduction in N,>'"'V'L t o  a proof in G ~ ' ~ ' ~ " ' " " ~ .  
Definition 6.1 The system G > ' " ' ~ ' " ~ " ~  is obtained from the system G : ' ~ ' ~ "  by adding the fol- 
lowing rule, known as the cut rule: 
The system G,>~A~V~ '~Cut  is obtained from G ~ ~ A ~ V * '  by adding the following rule, also known as 
the cut rule: 
Next, we define the procedure G mapping every deduction in N,""'~" to  a proof in Q > ' " ' ~ " ' ~ ~ ~ .  
The procedure G is defined by induction on the structure of deduction trees. Given a deduction 
tree V of C from the assumptions r, 
6 yields a proof G ( V )  of the sequent J?- k- C 
where I?- is the multiset Al ,  . . . , A, obtained from the context I? = XI: A1,. . . , x,: A, by erasing 
21,. . . ,x,. 
a The deduction r, x: A I- A is mapped to the axiom r-, A I- A. 
A deduction V of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
A deduction V of the form 
is mapped to  the proof 
A deduction V of the form 
r-fi A A B  
is mapped to  the proof 
and similarly for the symmetric rule. 
A deduction V of the form 
is mapped to  the proof 
A deduction V of the form 
is mapped to  the proof 
a A deduction 27 of the form 
is mapped to  the proof 
and similarly for the symmetric rule. 
a A deduction 2) of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
This concludes the definition of the procedure 6. 
For the sake of completeness, we also extend the definition of the function N which is presently 
defined on the set of sequential proofs of the system G>'"'"'~ t o  proofs with cuts, that is, to  proofs 
in the system G ~ ' " ' ~ ' ' ' ~ " ~ .  A proof ll of the form 
n1 n2 
TI-- A A,I't- C 
I ' I -C  
is mapped to  the deduction obtained as follows: First, construct 
and 
Modify N(II1) to a deduction Af(II1)' with conclusion r* I- A. Then, replace every leaf x: A, A, r* I- 
A in N(I12) by A + N(n,)', delete "x: A" from the antecedent in every sequent, and rectify this 
last tree. 
7 First-Order Quantifiers 
We extend the systems JI( '~~~"" and ~ ~ ~ A ~ V " ~ C Y t  to deal with the quantifiers. 
37A'v7v'311 for intuitionistic first- Definition 7.1 The axioms and inference rules of the system % 
order logic are listed below: 
r , x :A t -  A 
with A #I, 
r t - A A B  rt- A A B  
(A-elim) ( A-elim) rt- A rt- B 
I? I- A[u / t ]  I? I- V t A  
(V-intro) r I- V t A  (V-elim) I' + A [ r / t ]  
where in (V-intro), u does not occur free in r or VtA; 
where in (3-elim),  u does not occur free in I?, 3 tA ,  or C. 
The variable u is called the eigenvariable of the inference. 
One should observe that we are now using two kinds of variables: term (or package) variables 
( x ,  y, z , .  . .), and individual (or type) variables ( t ,  u, . . .). 
The typed A-calculus ~ ' 9 ~ 7 + v ~ 3 ~ 7 ~  corresponding to 4''A'V'V'3'1 is given in the following defini- 
tion. 
Definition 7.2 The typed A-calculus ~ ' 7 ~ 7 ~ 9 ' 9 ~ 7 '  is defined by  the following rules. 
with A #I, 
r , x : A t . M : B  
(abstraction) 
r D ( X x : A .  M ) : A +  B 
~ D M : A +  B ~ D N : A  
(application) r D ( M N ) :  B 
I ? D M : A  r t > N : B  
(pairing) 
r t , ( M , N ) : A x  B 
~ D M : A x  B r t . M : A x  B 
(projection) (projection) r D T ~ ( M ) :  A r t. T ~ ( M ) :  B 
r r > M : A  ~ D M : B  
(injection) r D i n l ( M ) :  A + B r D i n r ( M ) :  A + B (injection) 
r t . P : A + B  r , x : A p M : C  r , y : B r , N : C  
( by-cases) r D case(P,  Ax: A.  M ,  Ay: B .  N ) :  C 
~ D P : A + B  r , x : A b M : C  r , y : B b N : C  
( by-cases) r D ( c a s e  P of i n l ( x :  A )  + M I i n r ( y :  B )  + N ) :  C 
where u does not occur free in or VtA; 
r D M :  A[r/t] 
(3-intro) r D inx( r ,  M):  3tA 
D M: 3tA I?, x: A[u/t] D N:  C 
(3-elim) r D casex(M, Xu: 1. Ax: A[u/t]. N): C 
where u does not occur free in r, 3tA, or C. 
In the term (Au: L. M ) ,  the type i stands for the type of individuals. Note that  
r D Xu: L. Ax: A[u/t]. N :  Vu(A[u/t] ---, C). 
The term Xu: 1. Ax: A[u/t]. N contains the type A[u/t] which is a dependent type, since i t  usually 
contains occurrences of u. Observe that (Xu: L .  Ax: A[u/t]. N ) T  reduces t o  Ax: A[r/t]. N[r /u] ,  in 
which the type of x is now A[r/t].  The term casex(M, Xu: L. Ax: A[u/t]. N )  is also denoted as 
casex M of inx(u: L, x: A[u/t]) + N ,  or even casex M of inx(u,  x )  + N, and the  (3-elim) rule 
r D M :  3tA r, x: A[u/t] D N :  C 
(3-elim) 
I' D (casex M of inx(u: L ,  x: A[u/t]) + N): C 
where u does not occur free in l?, 3tA, or C.  
Such a formalism can be easily generalized to  many sorts (base types), if quantified formulae 
are written as Vt: a. A and 3t: a. A, where a is a sort (base type). A further generalization would 
be to  allow higher-order quantification as in Girard's system F, (see Girard [ l l ]  or Gallier [7]). We 
also have the following reduction rules. 
Def ini t ion 7.3 The reduction rules of the system X'yxtf 1'1~7~ are listed below: 
(Ax: A. M ) N  - M[N/x], 
. l ( (M?N))  - M ,  
.2((M, N ) )  - N ,  
c a s e ( i n l ( P ) ,  M,  N )  - M P ,  or 
c a s e  i n l ( P )  of i n l ( x :  A )  => M I inr(y:  B )  + N --+ M[P/x] ,  
c a s e ( i n r ( P ) ,  M,  N )  - N P ,  or 
c a s e  i n r ( P )  of i n l ( x :  A) + M I in r (y :  B )  + N - N [PIy],  
VA'B(M)N + VB(M),  
TI(VAXB(M)) - VA(M),  
T ~ ( v A x B ( M ) )  - VB(M), 
(At: L. M ) T  - M[r/ t ] ,  
D V ~ A ( M ) T  - V A [ T / ~ ] ( ~ ) ,  
c ~ s ~ ( v A + B ( ~ ) ,  M, N )  - VC(P),  
casex(inx(r, P), M )  - (Mr )P ,  or 
casex inx(r,  P) of inx(t: L, x: A)  += N - N[r / t ,  P/x],  
c a s e x ( v 3 t ~  ( P )  , M) - vc (P) . 
A fundamental result a.bout natural deduction is the fact that every proof (term) reduces to  a 
normal form, which is unique up to  a-renaming. This result was first proved by Prawitz [24] for 
3,A,V>V,3, . l  the system Ni 
Theorem 7.4 [Church-Rosser property, Prawi tz (1971)l Reduction in ~ ' 9 ~ 7 + 9 ~ ~ ~ 7 ~  (specified in 
Definition 7.3) is confluent. Equivalently, conversion in ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ 9 ~ 7 ~  is Church-Rosser. 
A proof can be given by adapting the method of Tait and Martin-Lof [21] using a form of 
parallel reduction (see also Barendregt [2], Hindley and Seldin [15], or Stenlund [27]). 
Theorem 7.5 [Strong normalization property, Prawitz (1971)l Reduction in ~ ' * ~ ! + 9 ~ * ~ * ~  is strongly 
normalizing. 
A proof can be given by adapting Tait's reducibility method [28], 1301, as done in Girard [lo] 
(1971)) [ll] (1972) (see also Gallier [7]). 
If one looks carefully a t  the structure of proofs, one realizes that i t  is not unreasonable t o  declare 
other proofs as being redundant, and thus to add some additional reduction rules. For example, 
the proof term (nl(M),  r 2 ( M ) )  can be identified with M itself. Similarly, if x is not free in M ,  the 
term Ax: A.  (Mx)  can be identified with M. Thus, we have the following additional set of reduction 
rules: 
Ax: A. (Mx) - M, if x 4 FV(M),  
(r1(M), xz(M)) - M7 
case  M of in l (x :  A) a in l (x)  1 inr(y: B) a inr(y)  -+ M, 
At :  L. (Mt)  - M, if t 4 FV(M),  
casex M of inx(u: L, x: A[u/t]) inx(u, x) - M, if u 4 FV(M).  
These rules are important in setting up categorical semantics for intuitionistic logic. However, a 
discussion of this topic would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Actually, in order t o  salvage 
some form of subformula property ruined by the introduction of the connectives V, 3, and I, one 
can add further conversions known as "commuting conversions" (or "permutative conversions"). A 
lucid discussion of the necessity for such rules can be found in Girard [9]. Theorem 7.4 and theorem 
7.5 can be extended to  cover the reduction rules of definition 7.3 together with the new reductions 
rules, but a t  the cost of rather tedious and rather noninstructive technical complications. Due to  
the lack of space, we will not elaborate any further on this subject and simply refer the interested 
reader to  Prawitz [23], Girard [ l l ] ,  or Girard [9] for details. 
A sequent-calculus formulation for intuitionistic first-order logic is given in the next definition. 
Definition 7.6 The axioms and inference rules of the system ~ ~ ' A 7 V ' v ' 3 ' 1 ' c u t  for intuitionistic first- 
order logic are given below. 
A , r k  A 
r F L  
(I: right) rI- A 
with A #I, 
A , A , r I -  C 
(contrac: left) 
A , r I -  C 
A , B , r t -  C I ' l - A  ~ P B  
(A: "eft r I- A B (A:  right) A A  B , r k  C 
A , r I -  C B , r I -  C 
(V: left) 
A V B , r I -  C 
T I -  A r ~ - B  
(v:  right) (v:  right) r ~ -  A V B  r ~ - A V B  
A B,I'I- C A , ~ I -  B 
( 3 :  left) (3 :  right) 
A 3 B , ~ I -  C T I - A > B  
A[T/x], r I- C 
VxA, r I- C I- A[yJx1 (V: right) (V: "ft) , I- VxA 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[Y/x], I- C r I- A[T/x] (3: left) (3: right) 
3xA,  r I- C 3xA 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable y is called the eigenvariable of the inference. 
A variation of the system ~ 3 ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~  in which negation appears explicitly is obtained by 
replacing the rule 
r I-I 
( I :  right) rI- A 
by the rule 
r I- 
( weakening: right) rI- A 
and adding the following negation rules: 
I'I- A A , ~ I -  
( 1 :  k f i )  rI- lA ( 1 :  right) i A ,  I? I- 
The resulting system is denoted as G ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ .  
The system G ~ 7 A 9 V 7 v ~ 3 9 ' 7 C u t  of classical logic is shown in the next definition. 
Definition 7.7 The axioms and inference rules of the system ~ , > 7 ~ 7 ~ 9 ~ 7 ~ 7 ~ 1 ~ ~ ~  for classical first-order 
logic are given below. 
A , r i -  A , A  
A,A,rn- A r ~ -  A , A , A  
(contrac: left) (contmc: right) 
A , ~ F  A I'b A , A  
I't- A , L  
(I: right) 
I'I- A , A  
with A f 1, 
I ' I - A , A  A , ~ F  A 
I ' I - A  (cut) 
A , B , I ' k  A r k A , A  r ~ - A , B  
(A: left) (A: right) 
A A B , I ' t -  A r ~ - A , A A B  
A , r i -  A B , r k  A rt- A , A , B  
(v: left) (v: right) 
A v  B , r k  A PI- A , A V  B 
I'F A , A  B , r t -  A A , r k  A , B  
f I- A, a , (3: right) A 3 B , r k  A 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[ylxI, I' r- A r I- A, A[T/X] 
(3:  left) I- A, 3xA (3: right) 3xA, I' t- A 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
A variation of the system ~ , > 9 A ~ V 1 v ~ 3 7 1 ~ c " t  in which negation appears explicitly is obtained by 
deleting the rule 
rt- A , l  
(I: right) 
I't- A , A  
and adding the following negation rules: 
rt- A , A  A , ~ I -  A 
(1: left) (7: right) 
l A ,  I' I- A r e  A , i A  
Indeed, it is easy to see that the rule 
r k  A 
( weakening: right) 
I'c- A ,A 
is derivable (using the axioms A, I' I- A, A). The resulting system is denoted as ~ , > 1 ~ 9 ~ ~ Y ~ 7 ' 7 ~ ~ ~ .  
We now extend the functions N and 6 to deal with the quantifier rules. The procedure N is 
extended to ~ ? ? f " V ' v * 3 ' 1 , c " t  
t as follows. 
r A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  a deduction obtained as follows. First, map 111 to  
Next, replace every leaf of the form y :  A[r/x],A, I'* I- A[r/x] in N(II1) by the subtree 
replace every occurrence of " y :  A[T/x]" in the resulting tree by " y :  Vx A", and rectify this last tree. 
r A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
r A proof II of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
and rectify this last tree. 
a A proof I1 of the form 
is mapped to  the deduction 
It is easily seen that Lemma 5.5 generalizes to  quantifiers. 
Lemma 7.8 [Gentzen (1935), Prawitz (1965)] For every proof II i n  &7?'A'V'v'3'L, N ( n )  is a de- 
duction in  normal form (in Ni >,A,V,V,3,1 ). 
Next, we extend the procedure E to 43'A'V'v'3'L. 
A deduction V of the form 
-49 1 
r I- A[ylxI 
is mapped to the proof 
A deduction V of the form 
r I- A[T/x] 
is mapped to  the proof 
Wl) A[T/x], I?- I- A[T/x] 
r A deduction 2) of the form 
is mapped to  the proof 
A deduction V of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
We now turn t o  cut elimination. 
8 Gentzen's Cut Elimination Theorem 
3,A,V,v73,-L to G,?,A,v,V,3,L,cut As we said earlier before presenting the function G from Ni , it is possible 
to show that the system G ~ ' ~ " " ~ ' ~ ~ " ~ " ~  is equivalent to the seemingly weaker system Gi > , ~ , v , V , 3 , 1  
We have the following fundamental result. 
Theorem 8.1 [Cut Elimination Theorem, Gentzen (1935)l There is an algorithm which, given 
any proof II in ~ ~ ? , " , v , ~ > 3 t l ' c " t  produces a cut-free proof II' in B ~ ~ ~ " ' ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ .  There is an algorithm 
which, given any proof II in G,>~A'V~v3~1~C"t  produces a cut-free proof II' in  ~ 2 1 ~ 7 ~ 7 ~ 7 ~ 7 ~ .  
Proof. The proof is quite involved. It consists in pushing up cuts towards the leaves, and in 
breaking cuts involving compound formulae into cuts on smaller subformulae. Full details are given 
for the system CX: in Section 12. Interestingly, the need for the contraction rule arises when a cut 
involves an axiom. The typical example is as follows. The proof 
is equivalent t o  a (contrac: left), and it is eliminated by forming the proof 
n 1 
A , A , ~ I -  C 
(contrac: left) 
If we are interested in cut-free proofs, except in classical propositional logic, the contraction 
rules cannot be dispensed with. We already saw in Example 4.4 that T I ( P  V 1 P )  is a proposition 
which is not provable without contractions in G ; > ' ~ ' ~ " .  Another example involving quantifiers is 
the sequent Vx3y(Py A 1 P z )  I- which is not provable without contractions in G'~9A7V'v73" or even 
3 , A , V , V 3 3 , 1 .  in 6,>>A1V3v>3t'. This sequent has the following proof in 6; 
Example  8.2 
Pu ,  1 P x ,  P v  I- P u  
- - - 
P u ,  1 P x ,  Pv,  7 P u  t- 
vx3y(Py A iPx) ,vx3y(Py A ~ P x )  I- 
(contrac: left) 
Vx3y(Py A 1 P x )  I- 
It is an interesting exercise to  find a deduction of Vx3y(Py A 1 P x )  >I in ~"A'V'v'3'1. 
For classical logic, it is possible to show that the contraction rules are only needed to  permit an 
unbounded number of applications of the (V: left)-rule and the (3: right)-rule (see lemma 8.7 ). For 
example, the formula 3xVy(Py > P x )  is provable in 6 2 9 A 9 V 1 v > 3 1 1 ,  but not without the rule (contrac: 
right). The cut-free system G , > J ' " " ~ > ~ ' ~  can be modified to obtain another system 6 ~ , > 7 ~ 9 ~ 9 ~ 9 ~ 3 ~  in 
which the contraction rules are deleted and the quantifier rules are slightly changed to  incorporate 
contraction. 
Definition 8.3 The axioms and inference rules of the cut-free system 6 ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ > ~ ' ~  for classical 
first-order logic are given below. 
A , ~ I -  A,A 
A,B,I 'I-  A r t - A , A  I 'a-A,B 
(A: left) (A: right) 
A A B , F I - A  I ' I - A , A A B  
A , r e  A B , ~ I -  A r e  A , A , B  
(V: left) (v: right) 
AV B,I't- A F F  A , A v  B 
r e  A , A  B , ~ I - A  A , ~ F  A ,B  
I ' I - A , A 3 B  
(1: right) 
A 3 B , r +  A 
VxA, A[T/x], r I- A 
VxA, I' I- A (': left) I' I- A, Vx A 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[Y/x], r t- A e A, 3xA, A[T/x] (3: left) (3: right) 
3xA, r I- A r t- A, 3xA 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The above system is inspired from Kleene [18] (see system G3, page 481). Note that contraction 
steps have been incorporated in the (V: left)-rule and the (3: right)-rule. As noted in the discussion 
before definition 4.3, if we consider sequents in which the righthand side is nonempty, using axioms 
of the form 
I , r t -  A ,A  
is equivalent t o  using the rule 
rt- A , I  
(I: right) 
rt- A,A 
with A #I. However, the axioms I, I? I- A,  A are technically simpler to  handle in proving the next 
three lemmas, and thus we prefer them to the rule (I: right). Accordingly, from now on, we will 
also assume that 6,>*A9V~v~391 has been formulated using the axioms I, r I- A, A rather than the 
rule (I: right). 
The equivalence of the systems 6 , > 3 A 9 V * v ' 3 3 1  and 6K23A>V7v93*1 is shown using two lemmas inspired 
from Kleene [18] (1952). First, it is quite easy to  see that every proof in 6K,>9A~v~v7311 can be 
converted to a proof in 6,>J"'V*v9331. 
For the converse, we warn the reader that some of the lemmas given in an earlier version were 
incorrect. The proof of the converse is quite tricky, and we are grateful t o  Peter Baumann for 
pointing out the earlier errors and helping me in working out the new proof. The plan of attack is 
to show that the weakening and contraction rules are derived rules of the system For 
the weakening rules, this follows immediately by induction, the crucial fact being that the axioms 
are "fat", that is of the form A, r I- A, A. For technical reasons (in the proof of lemma 8.5), we will 
need the fact that in 6K,>"'3V3v73>1, every provable sequent has a proof in which every axiom has a 
special form. Such axioms A, r I- A, A are such that the formula A itself is atomic, all formulae 
in r are atomic or universal, and all formulae in A are atomic or existential. Such axioms will be 
called atomic axioms. 
Lemma 8.4 Every proof ll i n  6 1 ~ 2 ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  of a sequent A1,. . . ,A, I- B1,. . . , B, can be trans- 
formed into a proof with atomic axioms. 
Proof. In constructing a proof, whenever the rule (V: left) of definition 8.3 is used, let us mark 
the occurrence of VxA recopied in the premise, and similarly mark the occurrence of 3xA recopied 
in the premise when (3: right) is used. The lemma is then shown by induction on lAll + . . . + 
IA,I + ]Ell + .. .+ IB,I, the sum of the sizes of the unmarked formulae A1,. ..,A,, Bl, .  .., B, in 
a sequent. 17 
We now prove a useful permutation lemma. Given an inference of ~ K 2 9 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ 9 ~ 9 ~ ,  note that the 
inference creates a new occurrence of a formula called the principal formula. 
Lemma 8.5 Given a proof II with atomic azioms i n  ~ K , > " ' 9 ~ ' ~ 9 ~ 9 ~  of a sequent I' A, for every 
selected occurrence of a formula of the form A A B, A V B,  or A > B i n  r or A, or 3xA i n  r, or 
VxA i n  A, there is another proof 111 whose last inference has the specified occurrence of the formula 
as its principal formula. Furthermore, depth(II1) 5 depth(II) .  
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the proof tree. There are a number of 
cases depending on what the last inference is. 
Lemma 8.5 does not hold for an occurrence of a formula VxA in r or for a formula 3xA in A, 
because the inference that creates it involves a term r ,  and moving this inference down in the proof 
may cause a conflict with the side condition on the eigenvariable y involved in the rules (V: right) 
or (3: left).  As shown by the following example, Lemma 8.5 also fails for intuitionistic logic. The 
sequent P,  ( P  > Q),  (R 3 S )  I- Q has the following proof: 
P , ( P  3 Q), (R 3 S)I- Q 
On the other hand, the following tree is not a proof: 
PI- P P , Q F  R P,SF P P,S,QI- Q 
P , ( P  3 Q)I- R p, ( P  3 Q ) ,  SI- Q 
This shows that in searching for a proof, one has to be careful not to stop after the first failure. 
Since the contraction rule cannot be dispensed with, it is not obvious at all that provability of an 
intuitionistic propositional sequent is a decidable property. In fact, it is, but proving it requires a 
fairly subtle argument. We will present an argument due to Kleene. For the time being, we return 
to  classical logic. 
Lemma 8.6 Given any formula A, any pairwise disjoint sets of variables {xl, . . . , x,), {yl, . . . , y,)
and {zl, . . . , z,), and any proof II with atomic axioms of a sequent A[yl/xl,. . . , yn/xn], A[zl/xl,. . . , 
zn/xn], I' I- A i n  ~ ~ , > * ~ > ~ 9 ~ 3 ~ 9 ~  (resp. of a sequent r I- A, A[yl/xl,. . . , yn/xn], A[zl/xl,..  . , zn/xn]), 
if the variables y; and zj are not free in  r, A,  or A ,  then there is a proof of the sequent A[yl/xl,..  . , 
yn/xn], r I- A and a proof of the sequent A[zl/xl,. . . , z,/x,], I? r- A (resp. there is a proof of the 
sequent r I- A, A[yl/xl,. . . , yn/x,] and a proof of the sequent I'I- A, A[zl/xl,. . . , zn/xn]). 
Proof. We prove the slightly more general claim: 
Claim. Given any formula A, any pairwise disjoint sets of variables {xl, . . . , x,), { yl, . . . , y,) 
and {zl,. . . , zn}, and any proof II with atomic axioms of a sequent A[yl/xl, . . . , yn/xn], A[zl/xl,. . . , 
zn/xn], r I- A in G I C , > " ' " ' * ~ * ~ ~ ~  (resp. of a sequent I' I- A, A[y1/xl,. . . , y,/x,], A[zl/zl,. . . , zn/xn]), 
if the yi and zj are not free in A,  then there is a proof of A[yl/xl,. . . , y,/x,], I'[yl/zl,. . . , y,/z,] F 
A [ ~ l / z l , .  . - ~ n / z n ]  and a proof of A [ z l / ~ l ,  - . -  zn/xn], r [ z l / ~ l , .  , z n / ~ n ]  I- A[~I /YI ,  zn/yn] 
(resp. there is a proof of I'[yl/zl, ..., yn/zn] I- A[yl/zl, ..., yn/zn],A[yl/xl ,..., y,/z,] and a 
proof of r [ z l / ~ l ,  . . . , z n / ~ n ]  I- A[zl/yl 9 .  - ., zn/~n] ,  A[zl/xl, - -, zn/xn])- 
The proof of the claim is by induction on the structure of the proof tree and uses lemma 8.5. 
We can now prove that in classical logic, the contraction rules are only needed for the quantifier- 
rules. 
Lemma 8.7 [Contraction elimination] The contraction rules are derivable in the system 
~xc>,A,v,v*3,1 
Proof. First, by lemma 8.4, we know that it is sufficient to  consider proofs with atomic axioms. 
We establish the following claim: 
Claim: Given any m formulae Al , .  . . ,Am a,nd any n formulae B1,. .. , B,, every proof II with 
atomic axioms in G I C ~ > J " ' ~ ' ~ > ~ ~ ~  of the sequent Al, Al, . . . , Am, Am, I? I- B1, B1,. . . , B,, B,, A can 
be converted to  a proof of the sequent Al, . . . , A,, r I- B1,. . . , B,, A . 
The claim is proved by induction on the pairs 
where {[A1/, .. . , IA,I, IBII,. . ., IB,() is the multiset of the sizes of the formulae A1,. .. ,A,, B1,. .. , 
B,, and h is the depth of TI. When A1 is of the form A A B, A V B,  A 3 B or VxA, or B1 is of 
the form A A B, A V B, A > B or 3xA, we use the induction hypothesis and lemma 8.5. When A1 
is of the form 3xA or B1 is of the form VxA, we use lemma 8.5 and lemma 8.6. In this case, the 
multiset component is always reduced. 
Since the weakening and the contraction rules are derivable in ( 7 ~ , > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  i t  is possible to  
convert every proof in f 3 ' 2 1 A 9 V 7 v * 3 ' 1  into a proof in G I C , > ' " ~ " ~ ~ ' ~ * ~ .  Thus, the systems (,7,>7A~V~v~3"- and 
&?K,>J"'V7v7391 are equivalent. Note in passing that a semantic proof can also be given. Indeed, 
it is possible t o  show that G / C ~ " ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " -  is complete (see Gallier [6]). Also, as suggested by Peter 
Baumann, it is possible to prove directly that every proof in ~ j 7 ~ * ~ 7 ~ 9 ~ 7 ~  can be converted to  a proof 
in 6 ~ 2 9 ~ 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ .  Given a proof II in ~ , > 9 " * " 1 ~ 9 ~ 9 ~ ,  the idea is to  eliminate one by one all top-level 
instances of contraction rules in TI. For every such subproof TI', every inference above the root is 
not a contraction. This allows us to work with contraction-free proofs in G27A7V7v93*1, and to prove 
lemmas analogous t o  lemma 8.5 and lemma 8.6. 
We now present a cut-free system for intuitionistic logic which does not include any explicit 
contraction rules and in which the premise of every sequent can be interpreted as a set. Using this 
system GK; due to  Kleene (see system G3a, page 481, in [18]), we can give a very nice proof of 
the decidability of provability in intuitionistic propositional logic. The idea behind this system is 
to systematically keep a copy of the principal formula in the premise(s) of every left-rule. Since 
Lemma 8.7 fails for intuitionistic logic, such a system is of interest. 
Defini t ion 8.8 The axioms and inference rules of the system 9 ~ ~ ' " ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~  for intuitionistie first- 
order logic are given below. 
A,Ft-- A 
A A  B,A,B,I ' I -  C FI-A FI-B 
(A :  ' e f t )  I- A (A: right) A A B , r t -  C 
AV B , A , r I -  C A V  B , B , F E  C 
(v: left) 
A V B , ~ I - C  
I'I- A rt-B 
(v: right) (v: right) ri- A V B  I ' I - A V B  
A 3  B,I ' I -A A I ) B , B , I ' I - C  A,I'I- B 
(3: lef t)  (3: right) 
A 3  B , ~ I - C  I ' I - A I B  
QxA, A[r/x], I' I- C 
QxA, T I- C 
I- (Q: right) 0': lef t)  VxA 
where in (Q: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
3xA, A[y/x], I' I- C r I- A[r/x] 
(3: left) (3: right) 
3xA ,  r I- C r I- 3xA 
where in (3: left),  y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable y is called the eigenvariable of the inference. 
As noted in the discussion before definition 4.3, if we consider sequents in which the righthand 
side is nonempty, using axioms of the form 
is equivalent to  using the rule 
r I-1 
( I :  right) rk A 
with A #I. However, the axioms 1, r I- A are technically simpler to  handle, and thus we prefer 
them t o  the rule (I: right). Thus, from now on, we will assume that  ~,?'A1V'vy3'1 has been formulated 
using the axioms 1, r I- A rather than the rule (I: right). 
The following lemma shows that G I C " " ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ "  is equivalent to  G , ? ' " ' ~ ' ~ / ' ~ ' ~ ,  and also that  the 
premise of every sequent of GIC;> ' " ' "~~ '~ '~  can be viewed as a set. 
Lemma 8.9 For every sequent r I- C ,  every proof II in ~ 3 ' " ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~  can be transformed into a 
proof II' of I' I- C in ~ h " ~ " ' ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~  . Furthermore, a proof II' can be found such that every formula 
occurring on the left of any sequent in II' occurs exactly once. In other words, for every sequent 
r I- C in II', the premise I? can be viewed as a set. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of 11. The case where the last inference (at 
the root of the tree) is a contraction follows by the induction hypothesis. Otherwise, the sequent to  
be proved is either of the form I' I- D where I' is a set, or it is of the form A, A, A I- D. The first 
case reduces to  the second since r can be written as A,  A, and from a proof of A,  A I- D, we easily 
obtain a proof of A, A, A I- D. If the last inference applies to  a formula in A or D, the induction 
hypothesis yields the desired result. If the last inference applies to  one of the two A's, we apply 
the induction hypothesis and observe that the rules of GK; have been designed to  automatically 
contract the two occurrences of A that would normally be created. For example, if A = B A C, the 
induction hypothesis would yield a proof of A, B A C, B, C I- D considered as a set, and the (A: 
left)-rule of GK; yields A, B A C F D considered as a set. 
As a corollary of Lemma 8.9 we obtain the fact that provability is decidable for intuitionistic 
propositional logic. Similarly, Lemma 8.7 implies that provability is decidable for classical propo- 
sitional logic. 
Theorem 8.10 It is decidable whether a proposition is provable in q"A'V'L . It is decidable 
whether a proposition is provable in G,>7A*V2'~Cut. 
Proof. By the existence of the functions N and S ,  there is a proof of a proposition A in ~l(""'"" 
iff there is a proof of the sequent F A in ~ > ' A ' v " ' c " t .  By the cut elimination theorem (Theorem 
8.1), there is a proof in ~ > ' A I V ' L ' c u t  iff there is a proof in G:'" '~".  By Lemma 8.9, there is a proof in 
E""'~" iff there is a proof in G K ~ ' ~ ' ~ "  . Call a proof irredundant if for every sequent I? I- C in this 
proof, r is a set, and no sequent occurs twice on any path. If a proof contains a redundant sequent 
I' I- C occurring at  two locations on a path, it is clear that this proof can be shortened by replacing 
the subproof rooted at  the lower (closest to the root) location of the repeating sequent r I- C by 
the smaller subproof rooted at the higher location of the sequent r I- C. Thus, a redundant proof 
in G K , > ' ~ ' ~ ' '  can always be converted to an irredundant proof of the same sequent. Now, by lemma 
8.9, we can assume that for every proof in GKi of a given sequent, every node is labeled with 
a sequent whose lefthand side is a set. Furthermore, since we are considering cut-free proofs, only 
subformulae of the formulae occurring in the original sequent to  be proved can occur in this proof. 
Since the original sequent if finite, the number of all subformulae of the formulae occurring in this 
sequent is also finite, and thus there is a uniform bound on the size of every irredundant proof for 
this sequent. Thus, one simply has to search for an irredundant proof of the given sequent. 
By the cut elimination theorem (Theorem 8.1), there is a proof in G,>J"'V~'lC"t iff there is a 
proof in G , > ~ " ~ V ~ ' - .  By Lemma 8.7, there is a proof in G,>T~>"?' iff there is a proof in GIG,>'"""'. To 
conclude, note that every inference of SK~*"" '~ '  decreases the total number of connectives in the 
sequent. Thus, given a sequent, there are only finitely many proofs for it. 
As an exercise, the reader can show that the proposition 
known as Pierce's law, is not provable in but is provable classically in N2pA*V*L. 
The fact that in any cut-free proof (intuitionistic or classical) of a propositional sequent only 
subformulae of the formulae occurring in that sequent can occur is an important property called 
the subformula property. The subformula property is not preserved by the quantifier rules, and this 
suggests that provability in first-order intuitionistic logic or classical logic is undecidable. This can 
indeed be shown. 
9 Invertible Rules 
If one is interested in algorithmic proof search for a certain logic, then a cut-free sequent-calculus 
formulation of this logic is particularly well suited because of the subformula property. In this case, 
the property of invertibility of rules is crucial. Given that the inference rules for sequent calculi are 
of the form 
r F n  
rf I- A' (a) 
we say that a rule of type (a) is invertible when I" I- A' is provable iff I' I- A is provable, and that 
a rule of type (b) is invertible when I" I- A' is provable iff both I'l I- Al and r2 e A2 are provable. 
For usual inference rules, we can only claim that the conclusion of a rule is provable if the premises 
are provable, but the converse does not necessarily hold. When a cut-free sequent calculus has 
invertible rules and there is some measure of complexity such that the complexity of each premise 
is strictly smaller than the complexity of the conclusion, then we have a decidable proof system. 
This is the case of the propositional system 6~ ,> '"~"~'  or the system GK,>7A"'9' obtained from the 
system of definition 8.3 by deleting the axiom l, r I- A, A and adding the negation rules 
rt- A,A A,I'I- A 
(1: left) (7: right) 
TA, r I- A I'I- A , T A  
(the full systems also have invertible rules, but the complexity of the premises of quantifier rules 
is not smaller than the complexity of the conclusion). Systems of invertible rules for classical logic 
are used systematically in Gallier [6] (see section 3.4 and 5.4). In our opinion, such systems are 
best suited for presenting co~npleteness proofs in the most transparent fashion. 
One of the major differences between Gentzen systems for intuitionistic and classical logic 
presented so far, is that in intuitionistic systems, sequents are restricted to have at  most one 
formula on the righthand side of I-. This asymmetry causes the ( 3 :  left) and (v: right) rules 
of intuitionistic logic to  be different from their counterparts in classical logic, and in particular, 
the intuitionistic rules cause some loss of information. These rules are no longer invertible. For 
instance, the intuitionistic ( 3  : left )-rule is 
rI- A B , r I -  C 
(3: left) 
A 3 B , ~ I -  C
whereas its classical version is 
I'F A , C  B , r I -  C 
( 3 :  left) 
A ~ B , I ' I - C  
Note that C is dropped in the left premise of the intuitionistic version of the rule. Similarly, the 
intui tionistic (v: right )-rules are 
rI- A ~ F B  
(v: right) (V: right) rt- A V B  r t - A V B  
whereas the classical version is 
r ~ - A , B  
(v: right) rt- A V B  
Again, either A or B is dropped in the premise of the intuitionistic version of the rule. This loss 
of information is responsible for the fact that in searching for a proof of a sequent in G ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  
one cannot stop after having found a deduction tree which is not a proof (i.e. a deduction tree 
in which some leaf is not labeled with an axiom). The rules may have been tried in the wrong 
order, and i t  is necessary to  make sure that all attempts have failed t o  be sure that a sequent is 
not provable. In fact, proof search should be conducted in the system 61~:'"'~"~", since we know 
that searching for an irredundant proof terminates in the propositional case (see theorem 8.10). 
Takeuti [31] has made an interesting observation about invertibility of rules in intuitionistic 
cut-free sequent calculi, but before discussing this observation, we shall discuss other contraction- 
free systems for intuitionistic propositional logic for which decidability of provability is immediate. 
Such systems were discovered in the early fifties by Vorob'ev [35, 361. Interest in such systems 
has been revived recently due to some work in automated theorem proving by Dyckhoff [5], on 
the embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic (without using the exponentials) by Lincoln, 
Scedrov and Shankar [20], and on the complexity of cut-elimination by Hudelmaier [17]. In order t o  
simplify the discussion, we first consider propositional intuitionistic logic based on the connective 
3. The system GIG: of Definition 8.8 restricted to propositions built up only from 3 is shown 
below: 
A > B , r h A  A > B , B , r t - C  A , r k  B 
(3: left) (3 :  right) 
A > B , ~ I -  C  l ? t - A 3 B  
This system is contraction-free, but it is not immediately obvious that provability is decidable, 
since A > B is recopied in the premises of the (3: left)-rule. First, note that because the systems 
~IC~ 'A 'V7v '311  and ~ ~ ' A ' v ' v " . 3 "  are equivalent and because cut-elimination holds for G ? ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~  , then 
3'A'V1v'311. In fact, it is easy to verify that cut-elimination holds cut-elimination also holds for GICi 
for GK>. Now, it is easy to see that we can require A to  be atomic in an axiom, and to  see that 
we can drop A > B from the right premise and obtain an equivalent system. The new rule is 
A >  B,I'I- A B , r t - C  
(3: left) 
A 3 B , ~ I -  C  
Indeed, if we have a proof of A > B, B , r  I- C ,  since B ,  I' I- A > B is provable, by a cut we 
obtain that the sequent B , r  I- C is provable. Now, the difficulty is to  weaken the hypothesis 
A 3 B in the left premise. What is remarkable is that when A itself is an implication, that is 
when A > B is of the form (A' > B') > B,  then ((A' > B') 3 B )  I- (B' > B)  is provable. 
Furthermore, A', (B' > B )  I- ((A' > B') 3 B)  is also provable. As a consequence, for any r and 
any propositions A', B', B ,  D, the sequent r ,  ((A' > B') > B) I- (A' > D) is provable iff the sequent 
r, (B' > B) I- (A' > D) is provable. Then, it can be shown that B' > B does indeed work. Also, 
when A is atomic, the rule (3: left) is simplified to  a one-premise rule. The above discussion is 
intended as a motivation for the system L.77' presented next, but we warn the reader that the 
equivalence of the new system C.7'T3 with the previous system GIG? is not as simple as it seems. 
The new system C.7T3 (which is a subsystem of Dyckhoff's system [ 5 ] ) ,  is the following: 
P,B,I'l- C B>C, I 'B -A3B C , I ' + D  
( 3 :  lef t)  ( 3 :  left) 
P,P3  B , ~ F  C ( A 3  B )  >C,I'I- D 
A , r e  B 
(1: right) 
I ' I -A>B 
where P is atomic. 
As we said earlier, the equivalence of the new system C.7'T3 with the previous system GK;> is 
a bit challenging. A nice proof is given in Dyckhoff [5] .  
As an interesting application of the system C.7'T3, we observe that the sequent 
is provable. However, this sequent is not provable in G? without using a contraction. Indeed, the 
only cut-free and contraction-free proof of this sequent would require proving ( ( (P  > Q) 3 P) > P) 
in G>. However, this proposition is nonother than Pierce's law, and we leave it t o  the reader t o  
verify that it is not provable in the system C.7'T3. 
In showing that intuitionistic propositional logic can be embedded in linear logic (without using 
the exponentials), Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar [20] use a system ZCC* almost identical to CJ'T3, 
except that instead of the rule 
P , B , r k  C 
( 3 :  lef t)  
P,P 3 B , r t -  C 
they use the rule 
r I-P B , ~ F C  
( 3 :  lef t)  
P 3 B , r e  C 
with P atomic. This second rule is obviously sound, and it is trivial that the rule 
P , B , r I -  C 
( 3 :  le f t )  
P,P > B , ~ E  C 
Thus, the proof of the equivalence of C.7'T3 and GK;> directly implies the equivalence of ZLL* and 
GK;> (but the converse is not obvious). However, as far as proof search goes, the system C.77' is 
superior since it avoids work done on trying to derive P in favour of waiting until i t  is obvious. On 
the other hand, ZCC* is the right system for the translation into linear logic. 
Actually, it is possible to formulate a contraction-free system c . ~ ' T ~ ~ " ~ " ~ ~  for the whole of 
intuitionistic propositional logic. Such a system given in Dyckhoff [5] is shown below. 
Definition 9.1 The axioms and inference rules of the system CJT'*"~"*' are given below. 
where P is atomic; 
1 , r  I- A 
A , B , r t -  C  FA r k B  
(A: 'eft) A h B  (A: right) A A B , I ' t -  C 
A,I'I- C B , ~ F  C 
(v: left) 
AV B , r t -  C 
rI- A r ~ - B  
(V: right) (V: right) rt- A V B  I ' I - A V B  
where P is atomic; 
A,I't- B 
( 3 :  right) 
r t - A > B  
Among the (1: left) rules, notice that only (3: left4) is not invertible. The equivalence of 
~ 3 7 ~ ~ ~ 7 ~ ~ '  and G I C ? ' ~ ' "  is shown in Dyckhoff [5 ] .  
A nice feature of the system CJT'J"'~~' is that it yields easily the decidability of provability. 
Note that  under the multiset ordering, the complexity of the premises of each rule decreases strictly 
(we consider the multiset of the weights w(A) of the formulae A occurring in each sequent. We 
have w ( l )  = 1, w(P)  = 1 for an atom, w(A V B )  = w(A 3 B )  = w(A) + w(B) + 1, and 
w(A A B )  = w(A) + w(B) + 2). For example, in rule (3: left4), (A 3 B) > C is replaced by B > C 
and A 3 B ,  both of (strictly) smaller complexity. Thus, this system requires no test of circularity 
(test for the repetition of sequents to find irredundant proofs), unlike in the system GK;>'~"".  
Pitts  [22] reports on applications of the system L J 7  to  intuitionistic logic with quantification 
over propositional letters, with interesting applications t o  the theory of Heyting algebras. An in- 
depth study of invertibility and admissibility of rules in intuitionistic logic can be found in Paul 
Rozikre's elegant thesis [25].  
We now come back to  Takeuti's observation [31] (see Chapter 1, paragraph 8). The crucial fact 
about intuitionistic systems is not so much the fact that  sequents are restricted so that  righthand 
sides have at  most one formula, but that the application of the rules (2 :  right) and (V: right) should 
be restricted so that the righthand side of the conclusion of such a rule consists of a single formula 
(and similarly for (1: right) if 1 is not treated as an abbreviation). The intuitive reason is that 
the rule (2:  right) moves some formula from the lefthand side to  the righthand side of a sequent 
(and similarly for (7: right)), and (V:  right) involves a side condition. Now, we can view a classical 
sequent l? I- B1,. . . , B, as the corresponding intuitionistic sequent r I- B1 V . . . V B,. With this in 
mind, we can show the following result. 
Lemma 9.2 Let GTi "A'Vy'3'1 be the system ~ 2 9 " 7 " " 7 ~ 1 '  where the application of the rules, (3: 
right) and (V: right) is restricted to situations in which the conclusion of the inference is or sequent 
3,"!V,V,37' ifl whose righthand side has a single formula. Then, I' I- B1, . . . , B, is provable i n  G I ,  
>,A,V,V,3,1 l? I- B1 V . . . V B, is provable in Gi 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of proofs. In the case of an axiom A, l? I- A, A, 
letting D be the disjunction of the formulae in A ,  we easily obtain a proof of A, r I- D V A in 
by applications of (V: right) to  the axiom A, I' I- A. Similarly, 1 ,  I' I- D V A is provable 
since it is an axiom. It is also necessary to  show that a number of intuitionistic sequents are 
provable. For example, we need to show that the following sequents are intuitionistically provable: 
Going from ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 9 ~ 1 ~ * ~  to  G > ' " ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  it is much easier to assume that the cut rule can be used 
in G;, and then use cut elimination. For example, if the last inference is 
rI-  A,A B , r +  A 
A > B , r I -  A ( 3 :  left) 
letting D be the disjunction of the formulae in A,  by the induction hypothesis, we have proofs in 
G > ~ " ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  of l? I- A V D and 8, l? I- D. It is obvious that we also have proofs of A > B,  l? I- A V D 
and A > B , r  I- B > D, and thus a proof of A > B , r  I- (A V D) A ( B  > D) .  Since the sequent 
A > B,  l?, (A V D) A ( B  > D) I- D is provable, using a cut, we obtain that A 2 B,  I' I- D is 
provable, as desired. The reader should be aware that the special case where A is empty can arise 
and deserves special treatment. In this case, D corresponds to  I. We only treated the case where 
A is nonempty. The case where A is empty is actually simpler and is left to  the reader. The other 
cases are similar. 
We can also adapt the system G I C ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  to form a system GK7; '7"'V'V73'1 having the same 
39A1v1Vt391. In this system, it turns out that it is only necessary to  recopy the property as 67; 
principal formula in the rule (1: left), and of course in the rules ('d: left), (3: right). Such a system 
can be shown to  be complete w.r.t. Kripke semantics, and can be used to  show the existence of 
a finite counter-model in the case of a refutable proposition. This system is given in the next 
definition. 
Definition 9.3 The axioms and inference rules of the system G K T i  "A1V'Vt311 are given below. 
A,B,I'I- A I ' I -A,A r ~ - A , B  
(A: left) (A: right) 
A A B , I ' I - A  I'F A , A A B  
A , ~ I -  A B , ~ I -  A I't- A , A , B  
(v: left) (v: right) 
A V B , I ' I - A  rt- A , A V B  
A > B , I ' F A , A  B , I ' t - A  A,I'I- B 
( 3 :  left) (I: right) 
A > B , ~ F  A r ~ - A > B , A  
VxA, A[r/x], r I- A 
(V: left) 
VxA, T I- A 
(V: right) 
I' I- VxA, A 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[Y/x], I- A r I- A, A[r/x],gxA (3: left) (3: right) 
3xA, I? I- A r I- A, 3xA 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
In the system the application of the rules (3: right) and (V: right) is restricted 
to  premises whose righthand side have a single formula. Using lemmas analogous to  lemma 8.5, 
lemma 8.6, and lemma 8.7, it is possible to show that (contraction) and (weakening) are derived 
3,A,V,V73,1 rules, and that this system is equivalent to Gi , in the sense that a sequent r I- B1, . . . , B, 
is provable in iff I' I- B1 V . . . V Bn is provable in G : ' " ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ .  However, lemma 
8.5 now fails for propositions of the form A > B or VxA. However, i t  can be shown that all the 
rules are invertible except ( 3 :  right) and (V: right). These rules are responsible for the crucial 
nondeterminism arising in proof search procedures. However, i t  can be shown that the strategy 
consisting in alternating phases in which invertible rules are fully applied, and then one of the rules 
( 3 :  right) or (V: right) is applied once, is complete. As a matter of fact, this strategy amounts 
to  building a Kripke model in the shape of a tree. Failure to  complete this model corresponds t o  
provability.4 In the propositional case, it is also possible to formulate a contraction-free system 
similar to  the system C~7'>"7~9' .  Such a system is given in Dyckhoff [5]. 
>,A,V,V,3, l ,cut  10 A Proof-Term Calculus for Si 
Before we move on to  the sequent calculi CK and LJ  and a detailed proof of cut-elimination 
for these systems, it is worth describing a term calculus corresponding to  the sequent calculus 
G > ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ .  The idea behind the design of the term calculus of this section arose from inspiring 
conversations with Val Breazu-Tannen, whoom I gladly thank. In this calculus, a sequent r I- A 
4The management of quantified formulae is actually more complicated. For details, see Takeuti [31], Chapter 1, 
section 8. 
becomes a judgement r* D M: A, such that, if I' = A1,. . . , A, then r* = XI: Al, .. . , x,: A, is a 
context in which the x; are distinct variables and M is a proof term. Since the sequent calculus has 
rules for introducing formulae on the left of a sequent as well as on the right of a sequent, we will 
have to  create new variables to tag the newly created formulae, and some new term constructors. 
The reader should pay particular attention to  the use of the l e t  construct as a mechanism for 
suspending substitution. 
Definition 10.1 The term calculus associated with G > ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ " ~  is defined as follows. 
x: A, y: A , r  D M: B 
( contrac: left) 
z : A , r ~ l e t  z b e x : A @ y : A i n  M : B  
I ' D M : I  
( I :  right) r D v A ( M ) :  A 
with A # I ,  
x:A,y: B , r r , M : C  
(A: left) 
~ : A A  B , I ' b l e t  z be (x:A,y:B) i n  M : C  
F D M : A  I ' D N : B  
(A: right) 
I ' D ( M , N ) : A A B  
x : A , I ' D M : C  y : B , r ~  N : C  
(v: left) 
z: A V B,  I' D case z of in l (x :  A) + M I inr(y: B) + N: C 
~ D M : A  ~ D M : B  
(v:  right) (V: right) 
I' D i n l (M) :  A V B I' D inr(M):  A V B 
x:A,I 'D M : B  
(1: right) r D (AX: A. M I :  A B 
x: A[r/t], I' D M: C 
(V: left) 
z: VtA, I' D l e t  ZT be x: A[r/t] i n  M:  C 
I' D M: A[u/t] 
(V: right) r D (Xu: 1. M): VtA 
where u does not occur free in r or QtA; 
x: A[u/t], D M:  C 
(3: 
z: 3tA, I' D casex z of inx(u: 1, x: A[u/t]) + M :  C 
where u does not occur free in r, 3tA, or C;  
r D M: A[r/t] 
(3: right) r D inx(r,  M): 3tA 
The use of the l e t  construct in the cut rule and the rules (3 :  left) and (V: left) should be noted. 
The effect of the l e t  construct is to suspend substitution, and thus t o  allow more reductions t o  
take place. Most presentations use the following alternate rules in which substitution takes place 
immediately: 
~ D M : A  x :B , I 'DN:C  
z:  A 3 B, r D N[(zM)/x]: C (I: left) 
x: A [ r l t ] , I ' ~  M : C  
(V: left) 
Z: VtA, r D M[(zr)/x]:  C 
Thus, in some sense, a reduction strategy has already been imposed. This (usual) presentation 
facilitates the comparison with natural deduction, but makes it impossible t o  describe general cut- 
elimination rules. For the sake of historical accuracy, note that essentially the same system appears 
in section 2 of Girard's classic paper [lo].  With our system, it is possible to  write reduction rules 
that correspond to  cut-elimination steps (see section 12). For example, 
l e t  Ax: A. MI be 2: (A 3 B)  i n  ( l e t  zM2 be y: B i n  N )  - l e t  ( l e t  M2 be x: A i n  MI)  be y: B i n  N, 
l e t  (M, N)  be (x: A, y: B)  i n  P - l e t  M be x: A i n  ( l e t  N be y: B i n  P), 
l e t  (M, N)  be (x: A, y: B)  i n  P - l e t  N be y: B i n  ( l e t  M be x: A i n  P), 
l e t  M be u: A i n  ( l e t  z be (x: C, y: D) i n  N )  - l e t  z be (x: C, y: D) i n  ( l e t  M be u: A i n  N) ,  
l e t  M be x: A i n  (N1, N2) - ( l e t  M be x: A i n  Nl ,  l e t  M be x: A i n  N2), 
l e t  M be x: A i n  x - M. 
It can be shown that 
l e t  N be x: A i n  M -+ M[N/x]. 
However, the reduction rules corresponding to cut elimination are finer than @-conversion. This 
is the reason why it is quite difficult to prove a strong version of cut-elimination where all reduction 
sequences terminate. Such a proof was given by Dragalin [4]. If the alternate rules 
~ D M : A  x :B, I ' t>N:C 
z: A 2 B,  I' D N[(zM)/x]:C 
(1: left) 
x: A[r/t], J? D M: C 
(V: left) 
z: VtA, D M[(zr)/x]:C 
are used, then the reduction rules take a different form, For example, 
l e t  (M,  N) be (x: A, y: B )  i n  P - P[M/x,  N/y]. 
This amounts to  imposing certain strategies on the reductions in our calculus. In fact, i t  is possible 
to specify reduction rules imposing certain strategies, for example, eager or lazy evaluation. Such 
reduction strategies have been considered in a similar setting for linear logic by Abramsky [I]. 
The above proof-term assignment has the property that if r D M: A is derivable and I' A, 
then A D M:  A is also derivable. This is because the axioms are of the form I?, x: A D x: A. We can 
design a term assignment system for an CJ-style system. In such a system, the axioms are of the 
form 
x: A D x: A 
and the proof-term assignment for weakening is as follows: 
I ' D M : B  
(weakening: left) 
z : A , I ' ~ l e t  z be - i n  M : B  
Note that the above proof-term assignment has the property that if I'D M: A is provable and r 5 A, 
then A D N : A is also derivable for some N easily obtainable from M .  
If instead of the above (A: left) rule, we use the two CJ-style rules 
A , ~ F  C B,I'I- C 
(A: left) (A: left) 
AA B , r b  C A A B , I ' E C  
then we have the following proof-term assignment: 
x : A , ~ D M : C  
(A: left) 
~ : A A  B , I ' ~ l e t  z b e  (x:A,-)  i n M : C  
~ : B , I ' D  M : C  
(A: left) 
z : A A B , r ~ l e t z b e ( - , y : B ) i n M : C  
It is then natural to  write the normalization rules as 
l e t  (M, N )  be (x: A,-)  i n  P - l e t  M be x: A i n  P,  
l e t  (M,  N )  be (-, y: B)  i n  P - l e t  N be y: B i n  P. 
We note that for these new rules, the reduction is lazy, in the sense that it is unnecessary t o  
normalize N (or M )  since it is discarded. With the old rules, the reduction is generally eager since 
both M and N will have to be normalized, unless x or y do not appear in P. Such aspects of lazy 
or eager evaluation become even more obvious in linear logic, as stressed by Abramsky [I]. 
We now consider some equivalent Gentzen systems. 
11 The Gentzen Systems Lg and LK 
Axioms of the form A, I' I- A, A are very convenient for searching for proofs backwards, but for 
logical purity, it may be desirable to consider axioms of the form A I- A. We can redefine axioms 
to  be of this simpler form, but to preserve exactly the same notion of provability, we need to  add 
the following rules of weakening (also called thinning). 
Definition 11.1 The rules of weakening (or thinning) are 
r t - A  FI-  A 
(weakening: left) (weakening: right) 
A , r t -  A rI- A , A  
In the case of intuitionistic logic, we require that A be empty in (weakening: right). 
One can also observe that in order to make the (A:  left) rule and the (V: right) rule analogous 
to  the corresponding introduction rules in natural deduction, we can introduce the rules 
A , r k  A B,I'I- A 
(A: left) (A: left) 
A A B , I ' I - A  A A B,I't- A 
and 
I'E A , A  r k A , B  
(v: right) (v: right) 
I'I- A,A V B I'k A,AV B 
They are equivalent to  the old rules provided that we add (contrac: left), (contrac: right), (weakening: 
left) and (weakening: right). This leads us to the systems C.7 and LIC defined and studied by 
Gentzen [8] (except that Gentzen also had an explicit exchange rule, but we assume that we are 
dealing with multisets). 
Definition 11.2 The axioms and inference rules of the system L.7' for intuitionistic first-order 
logic are given below. 
Axioms: 
AI- A 
Structural Rules: 
r ~ - A  r I- 
(weakening: left) - (weakening: right) 
A , ~ I -  A I ' F A  
A , A , r k  A 
(contrac: left) 
A , r I -  A 
Logical Rules: 
A , r k  A B,I 'I-  A 
(A: left) (A: left) 
AA B , r k  A A A B , ~ I -  A
r l - A  r l - B  
(A: right) 
I'l- A A B  
A , r p  A B , ~ F  A 
(V: left) 
A V B , r k  A 
r~ A rt-B 
(V: right) (v: right) 
A v B  I'I- A V B  
A B , ~ I -  A A , r k  B 
f t  T I - A 3 8  ( 3 :  right) A > B , I ' I - A  
rl- A A , ~ I -  
( 1  1 r c  7A (7: right) l A ,  r I- 
In the logical rules above, A V B ,  A A B ,  A 3 B, and TA are called the principal formulae and A, 
B the side formulae of the inference. 
A[T/x], r I- A 
(V: left) 
VxA, r I- A A'yix' (V: right) I- VxA 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[?//x], r l- A I' I- A[T/x] 
(3: left) I- 3xA (3: right) 3xA,r1- A 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
In the above rules, A and O consist of at most one formula. The variable y is called the 
eigenvariable of the inference. The condition that the eigenvariable does not occur free in the 
conclusion of the rule is called the eigenvariable condition. The formula VxA (or 3xA) is called 
the principal formula of the inference, and the formula A[T/x] (or A[y/x]) the side formula of the 
inference. 
Definition 11.3 The axioms and inference rules of the system CK for classical first-order logic are 
given below. 
Axioms: 
A I -  A 
Structural Rules: 
r ~ -  A r ~ -  A 
(weakening: left) (weakening: right) 
A , r +  A TI-  A , A  
A , A , ~ I -  A I'I- A , A , A  
(contrac: left) (contrac: right) 
A , r c -  A rl- A , A  
Logical Rules: 
A , r k  A B,I 'I-  A 
(A: left) (A: left) 
A / \  B , r k  A A A B , I ' k A  
I 'c-A,A I ' t -A,B 
(A: right) 
I't- A , A A B  
A,I'I- A B , r k  A 
(v: left) 
AV B,I'I- A 
T F  A,A I'I- A , B  
(v: right) (v: right) 
r t - A , A V B  T F  A , A V B  
I'I- A ,A  B,I'c- A A , r c -  A , B  
(3 :  left) (1: right) 
A 3 B , r k  A I ' t A , A > B  
I'F A , A  A , ~ I -  A 
(7 :  left) (1:  right) 
TA, I' I- A r h  A , i A  
In the logical rules above, A v B, A A B, A > B, and TA are called the principal formulae and A, 
B the side formulae of the inference. 
where in (V: right), y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[Y/x], I' I- A I' I- A,  A[r/x] (3: left) (3: right) 
3xA, I' I- A I' F A,  3xA 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable y is called the eigenvariable of the inference. The condition that the eigenvariable 
does not occur free in the conclusion of the rule is called the eigenvariable condition. The formula 
VxA (or 3xA) is called the principal formula of the inference, and the formula A[T/x] (or A[y/x]) 
the side formula of the inference. 
One will note that the cut rule (multiplicative version) 
(with A empty in the intuitionistic case and O at most one formula) differs from the cut rule 
(additive version) 
I ' I -A ,A  A,I'I- A 
I'k A ( cut) 
used in ~ 2 * ~ 3 ~ * ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~  or in >'A1V9v'3"'c'"t, in that the premises do not require the contexts I?, 
A to  coincide, and the contexts A, O to coincide. These rules are equivalent using contraction 
and weakening. Similarly, the other logical rules of LK: (resp. CJ) and G , > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~  (resp. 
G>!A,V,vt3,',c~t ) are equivalent using contraction and weakening. 
12 Cut Elimination in f K (and LJ) 
The cut elimination theorem also applies to LK and L.7. Historically, this is the version of the cut 
elimination theorem proved by Gentzen [B] (1935). Gentzen's proof was later simplified by Tait [29] 
and Girard [13] (especially the induction measure). A simplified version of Tait's proof is nicely 
presented by Schwichtenberg 1261. The proof given here combines ideas from Tait and Girard. The 
induction measure used is due to Tait [29] (the cut-rank), but the explicit transformations are 
adapted from Girard [13], [9]. We need to define the cut-rank of a formula, the depth of a proof, 
and the logical depth of a proof. 
Definition 12.1 The degree I A( of a formula A is the number of logical connectives in A. Let 11 
be an LK-proof. The cut-rank c(II) of 11 is defined inductively as follows. If II is an axiom, then 
c(II) = 0. If II is not an axiom, the last inference has either one or two premises. In the first case, 
the premise of that inference is the root of a subtree IIl. In the second case, the left premise is 
the root of a subtree 111, and the right premise is the root of a subtree l12. If the last inference is 
not a cut, then if it has a single premise, c (n)  = c(IIl), else c(II) = max(c(II1), c(I12)). If the last 
inference is a cut with cut formula A, then c(n)  = max({lAl + l7c(II1),c(II2))). The depth of a 
proof tree II, denoted as d(II), is defined inductively as follows: d (n )  = 0, when 11 is an axiom. If 
the root of II is a single-premise rule, then d(n)  = d(II1) + 1. If the root of 11 is a two-premise rule, 
then d(II) = max(d(IIl),d(IIz)) + 1. We also define the logical depth of a proof tree 11, denoted 
as l(II), inductively as follows: l(IT) = 0, when 11 is an axiom. If the root of II is a single-premise 
rule, then if the lowest rule is structural, l(II) = 1(111), else l(II) = 1(111) + 1. If the root of II is a 
two-premise rule, then E(II) = max(l(II1), 1(112)) + 1. 
Thus, for an atomic formula, IAl = 0. Note that c(n) = 0 iff IT is cut free, and that if II contains 
cuts, then c(IT) is 1 + the maximum of the degrees of cut formulae in II. The difference between 
the depth d(II) and the logical depth l(II) is that structural rules are not counted in Z(IT). Both 
are needed in lemma 12.3, d(II) as an induction measure, and l(II) to bound the increase on the 
size of a proof. We also need the definition of the function exp(m, n,p).  
This function grows extremely fast in the argument n. Indeed, exp(m, 1 , ~ )  = mp, exp(m, 2,p) = 
mmP, and in general, exp(m, n, p) is an iterated stack of exponentials of height n, topped with a p: 
The main idea is to move the cuts "upward", until one of the two premises involved is an 
axiom. In attempting to design transformations for converting an LK-proof into a cut-free LK- 
proof, we have to deal with the case in which the cut formula A is contracted in some premise. A 
transformation to handle this case is given below. 
The symmetric rule in which a contraction takes place in the right subtree is not shown. How- 
ever, there is a problem with this transformation. The problem is that it yields infinite reduction 
sequences. Consider the following two transformation steps: 
The pattern with contractions on the left and on the right is repeated. 
One solution is to consider a more powerful kind of cut rule. In the sequel, the multiset r , n A  
denotes the multiset consisting of all occurrences of B # A in I' and of m + n occurrences of A 
where m is the number of occurrences of A in I?. 
Definition 12.2 (Extended cut rude) 
where m, n > 0. 
This rule coincides with the standard cut rule when m = n = 1, and it is immediately verified 
that it can be simulated by an application of the standard cut rule and some applications of the 
contraction rules. Thus, the system LICs obtained from CK: by replacing the cut rule by the 
extended cut rule is equivalent to CIC. From now on, we will be working with LIC+. The problem 
with contraction is then resolved, since we have the following transformation: 
We now prove the main lemma, for which a set of transformations will be needed. 
Lemma 12.3 [Reduction Lemma, Tait, Girard] Let 111 be an LKs -proof of r I- A, mA, and 112 
an LICS-proof of nA, A E- O, where m, n > 0, and assume that c(IIl), c(I12) 5 JAl. An LK:+-proof 
II of r ,  At- A, O can be constructed, such that c(II) 5 JA(.  We also have 1 ( T I )  5 2(2(111) + 1 ( 1 1 2 ) ) ,  
and if the rules for 3 are omitted, then l(II) 5 1(111) + l(I12). 
Proof. It proceeds by induction on d( I I l )~d( I12) ,5  where 111 and 112 are the immediate subtrees 
of the proof tree 
n1 n2 
I't- A,mA nA,At- O 
There are several (non-mutually exclusive) cases depending on the structure of the immediate 
subtrees 111 and I12. 
(1) The root of 111 and the root of 112 is the conclusion of some logical inference having some 
occurrence of the cut formula A as principal formula. We say that A is active. 
'The reader is warned that earlier versions of this proof used the wrong measure I(II1)+1(II2). Indeed, 1(111)+l(IIz) 
does not decrease in the case of the structural rules (in cases (2) and (4)  of the forthcoming proof). 
Every transformation comes in two versions. The first version corresponds t o  the case of an 
application of the standard cut rule. The other version, called the "cross-cuts" version, applies 
when the extended cut rule is involved. 
(i) (A: right) and (A: left) 
By the hypothesis c(IIl), c(I12) 5 IAl, and it is clear that for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 IAl, 
since c(II) = mas({lBI + l,c(=l),c(x3))), IBI + 1 5. IAl (since A = B A C),  c(n1) 5 c(IIl), 
c(na) 5 c(IIl), and c(r3) 5 c(I12). It is also easy to  establish the upper bound on l ( ~ ) . ~  
Cross-cuts version. Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or n = 0, and we 
only show the main case where m,  n > 0. Let A = B A C. 
Let IIi be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis t o  
and II; the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to  
B,I',At- A , @  
and finally let II be 
'The simple fact that m a x ( a ,  b )  < a + b for a, b 2 0 is used here and in the next cases. 
Since c(n1) I c(IIl), c(7r2) I c(II1), and c(7r3) 5 c(I12), by the induction hypothesis, we 
have c(IIi),c(IIh) 5 (Al, and it is clear that for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 IAl, since 
c(II) = max({l BI + 1, c(IIi), c(IIa))), and 1 BI + 1 5 IAI (since A = B A C).  It is also easy to  
establish the upper bound on l(II). 
(ii) (v: right) and (v: Eeft) 
By the hypothesis c(IIl), c(I12) 5 IAl, it is clear that for the new proof II we have c (n)  5 IAl, 
since c(II) = maz((lB1 + 1, C(TI), c ( x ~ ) ) ) ,  IBI + 1 I 1.41 (since A = B V C),  c ( n ~ )  I c(u1), 
c(a2) 5 c(IIn), and c(n3) 5 c(I12). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on l(II). 
Cross-cuts version: Similar to (i) (Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or 
n = 0). 
(iii) (3: right) and (3: left) 
Left as an exercise. 
(iv) (7: right) and (7: Eeft) 
By the hypothesis c(II1), c(I12) 5 IlAl, it is clear that  for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 I iA( ,  
since c(II) = max({lAl+ 1, c(nl), c(n2))), c(nl) 5 c(IIl), c( r2)  5 c(I12). It is also easy to  establish 
the upper bound on l(II). 
Cross-cuts version (Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or n = 0). 
Let IIi be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to  
and IIL the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis t o  
and finally let II be 
Since c(r1) 5 c(IIl), c(7r2) 5 c(I12), by the induction hypothesis c(IIi), c(n',) 5 IlAl, and it is 
clear that for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 IiAl, since c(II) = max({lAl+ 1, c(IIi), c(II',))). It 
is also easy to  establish the upper bound on 1(II). 
(v) (V: right) and (V: left) 
In the above, it may be necessary to rename some eigenvariables in   IT^ so that they are distinct 
from all the variables in t. 
By the hypothesis c(II1), c(I12) < IVxBJ, it is clear that for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 
IVxBI, since c (n )  = max({lB[tlxll + l,c(=l[tl~l),c(=2)))7 c(x1[tlyl) = c(=1), c(r1) I c(H1), and 
c(n2) 5 c(IIz). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on I@). 
Cross-cuts version (Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or n = O), 
Let II; be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to  
r ,  I- A, 0 ,  B[Y/x] 
and II', the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to  
=1 
r I- A,  m(VxB>, B[ylxI =2 
B[t/x], I?, A I- A, 0 
and finally let II be 
HI, nl, 
I?, At- A, @, B[t/x] B[t/x], r ,  A I- A, O 
In the above, it may be necessary to rename some eigenvariables in TI: so that they are distinct 
from all the variables in t. 
Since c(xl) < c(lll), and c(n2) 5 c(l12), by the induction hypothesis, c(II:),c(II',) 5 IVxBI, 
and it is clear that for the new proof II we have c (n)  < IVxBI, since c(II) = max({JB[t/x]l + 
1, c(IIi[t/y]), c(II',))) and c(II/l[t/y]) = c(II/l). It is also easy to  establish the upper bound on Z(II). 
(vi) (3: right) and (3: left) 
In the above, it may be necessary t o  rename some eigenvariables in nz so that they are distinct 
from all the variables in t .  
By the hypothesis, c(IT1), c(IT2) 5 13x81, It is clear that for the new proof II we have c(II) 5 
13xBI, since c(n)  = max({lB[t/xIl + l , c (n~ ) , c (nz [ t l~ l ) ) ) ,  c(n2[tlyl) = ~ ( ~ 2 1 ,  c(n1) I c(nl) ,  and 
c(n2) 5 c(I12). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on I(I1). 
Cross-cuts version (Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or n = 0). Similar 
to (v) and left as an exercise. 
(2) Either the root of 111 or the root of IIz is the conclusion of some logical rule, the cut rule, 
or some structural rule having some occurrence of a formula X # A as principal formula. We say 
that A is passive. 
We only show the transformations corresponding to the case where A is passive on the left, 
the case in which it is passive on the right being symmetric. For this case (where A is passive on 
the left), we only show the transformation where the last inference applied to  the left subtree is a 
right-rule, the others being similar. 
(i) (V:  right) 
Note that c(nl) < c(nl)  and c(n2) < c(I12). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis 
to the subtree rooted with r , A I- A,  O,  B. It is also easy to  establish the upper bound on l ( I I ) .  
(ii) (A:  right) 
Note that c(r1) 5 c(IIl), c(r2) 5 c(II1), and c(7r3) 5 c(l12). We conclude by applying the 
induction hypothesis to  the subtrees rooted with r, A t- A,  O, B and I', A r- A, O, C. It is also easy 
to establish the upper bound on l (n) .  
(iii) (1: right) 
Left as an exercise. 
(iv) (1:  right) 
Note that c(r1) 5 c(n1) ,  and c(?r2) 5 c(I12). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis 
to the subtree rooted with B ,  r, A I- A,  O. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on Z(II). 
(v )  (V: right) 
In the above, some renaming may be necessary to ensure the eigenvariable condition. 
Note that c(nl[z/y]) = c(nl), c(?rl) 5 c(IIl), and C ( K Z )  5 c(II2). We conclude by applying the 
induction hypothesis to  the subtree rooted with I?, A I- A ,  0, B[z/x]. It is also easy to  establish the 
upper bound on l(II). 
(vi)  (3: right) 
Note that c(nl) 5 c(IIl), and c(7r2) 5 c(I12). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis 
to the subtree rooted with I', A I- A,  O, B[t/x]. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on l (II) .  
(vii) (cut) 
where in the above proof T ,  ml + m2 = m, I' = r l ,  Al,  and A = A l ,  O1. Since by the hypothesis, 
c(IIl),c(II2) 5 (A( ,  and ~(111)  = max({lBI + l , c ( n ) , c ( ~ 2 ) ) ) ,  we must have IBI < (A( ,  c(.rrl) 5 IAl, 
c(7r2) 5 IAl, and c(7r3) 5 IAl. Thus in particular, B # A. We show the transformation in the case 
where ml > 0 and m2 > 0, the cases where either ml = 0 or m2 = 0 being special cases. 
Let II:  be the result of applying the induction hypothesis to  
Tl,AI-  A1,O,pB 
let IIf2 be the result of applying the induction hypothesis to 
and let II be the proof 
Since by the induction hypothesis, c(IIi), c(IIL) 5 )A(,  and since I BI < ( Al, we have c(D) 5 (A \ .  
It is also easy to establish the upper bound on l(II). 
(viii) (contmc: right) 
Note that c(nl ) 5 c(IIl), and c(n2) < c(I12). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis 
to the subtree rooted with r ,  A I- A, 0 ,  B, B. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on 1(II). 
(ix) (weakening: right) 
r ,A i -  A , O , B  
Note that c ( r l )  < c(II1), and C ( T ~ )  < c(I12). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis 
to the subtrees rooted with I?, A I- A, O. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on l(II). 
(3)  Either It1 or 112 is an axiom. We consider the case in which the left subtree is an axiom, 
the other case being symmetric. 
Note that c(7r2) 5 c(I12). Since by hypothesis c(IIl), c(I12) 5 IAl, it is clear that c(II) 5 1AJ. 
(4) Either the root of 111 or the root of IT2 is the conclusion of some thinning or contraction 
resulting in an occurrence of the cut formula A. We consider the case in which this happens in the 
succedent of the left subtree, the other case being symmetric. 
(i) (weakening: right) 
and when m, n > 0, 
Since by the hypothesis we have c(II1), c(I12) 5 [A],  it is clear that c (n )  5 [A[ in the first case. 
In the second case, since c(wl) 5 c(IIl) and c(n2) 5 c(I12), we conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis. 
(ii) (contrac: right) 
Since by the hypothesis we have c(II1),c(II2) 5 [ A [ ,  and we have c ( n l )  5 c(IIl) and c(r2) 5 
c(IIz), we conclude by applying the induction hypothesis. 
We can now prove the following major result (essentially due t o  Tait [29], 1968), showing not 
only that every proof can be transformed into a cut-free proof, but also giving an upper bound on 
the size of the resulting cut-free proof. 
Theorem 12.4 Let II be a proof with cut-rank c(II) of a sequent I? I- A.  A cut-free proof II* for 
I' I- A can be constructed such that l(II*) 5 exp(4, c(II),l(II)). 
Proof. We prove the following claim by induction on the depth of proof trees. 
Claim: Let 11 be a proof with cut-rank c(II) for a sequent r I- A. If c(II) > 0 then we can 
construct a proof II' for I' I- A such that 
c(IT1) < c(II) and /(HI) 5 4'("). 
Proof of Claim: If either the last inference of II is not a cut, or it is a cut and c(II) > JAl + 1, 
we apply the induction hypothesis to the immediate subtrees 111 or 112 (or 111) of Il. We are left 
with the case in which the last inference is a cut and c(II) = JAl + 1. The proof is of the form 
By the induction hypothesis, we can construct a proof IT: for I? F A,mA and a proof II; for 
nA,A I- 0, such that c(II:) < IAl and l(II:) < 41(nl), for i = 1,2. Applying the reduction lemma 
(Lemma 12.3), we obtain a proof IT' such that, c(II1) 5 IAJ and 1(IIt) 5 2(I(ITi) + l(IIi)). But 
The proof of Theorem 12.4 follows by induction on c(II), and by the definition of exp(4, m,n). 
It is easily verified that the above argument also goes through for the system LJ. Thus, we 
obtain Gentzen's original cut elimination theorem. 
Theorem 12.5 [Cut Elimination Theorem, Gentzen (1935)] There is an algorithm which, given 
any proof II in LK produces a cut-free proof II' in LK. There is an algorithm which, given any 
proof II in LJ produces a cut-free proof II' in CJ. 
It is instructive to see exactly where (contraction) and (weakening) are actually used in the 
transformations. Contraction is used in the cross-cuts, in the case of axioms (case (3)), and of 
course when it is the last inference of a proof (in case (2) and (4)). Weakening is only used in case 
(2) and (4), and this because we have chosen the minimal axioms A I- A. If we use the version of 
the cut rule (the additive version) in which the contexts are merged rather than concatenated 
and the corresponding extended cut rule 
we can verify that contraction is no longer needed in the cross-cuts, but it is still needed for the 
axioms, and of course when it is the last inference of a proof (in case (2) and (4)). If in addition 
we use the "fat7' axioms A, r I- A, A, it seems that the weakening rules are no longer needed, but 
this is in fact erroneous. It is true that weakening is not needed to  handle the case of axioms 
(only contraction is needed), but in case (2) for (contmc: left) and (contmc: right), weakening is 
needed! (see case (2)(viii) for example). This is somewhat ennoying since the transformation rules 
for weakening discard one of the two subproofs appearing as premises of a cut. Indeed, as observed 
by Yves Lafont, it is this property which causes any two classical proofs to be identified under the 
equivalence relation induced by the reduction rules for cut elimination. The proof 
reduces both to ?rl and ~ 2 ,  showing that the equivalence of classical proofs induced by cut- 
elimination is trivial. However, note that if we allow the new transformations which take a proof .rr 
of a sequent r t- A and create (the obvious) proof A + n of A, I- A and T + A of I' I- A, A, then 
weakening can be dispended with, and I conjecture that the equivalence of proofs is nontrivial. Still, 
note that the proofs of the axioms A I- A and B I- B (with A + B) will be equivalent since they 
are both equivalent to the proof of A,  B I- A, B, but this does not seem to be problematic. The 
intuitionistic calculus does not suffer from the same problem: the equivalence of proofs induced by 
cut elimination is nontrivial (this can be seen by mapping sequential proofs to natural deduction 
proofs and using the normal form property of X-terms). 
From theorem 12.4, we see that the complexity of cut-elimination is horrendous, since the upper 
bound on the size of a cut-free proof is exp(4, c(II), l(IT)), a super exponential. Careful inspection of 
the proof of lemma 12.3 shows that l (n )  5 1(111) + l(IIz), except for case (l)(iii). This is the reason 
for the upper bound exp(4, c(IT), l(H)), which applies even in the propositional case. However, 
Hudelmaier [17] has shown that for the system ,C,?'T"""'~', this upper bound can be reduced to  
a quadruple exponential, and in the classical case for a system similar to GIC37AyV7' to  a double 
exponential. But nothing is obtained for free! Indeed, the lower complexity of cut-elimination in 
the system ~ , 7 ' 7 ' * " 7 ~ 7 '  is attained at the cost of the computational expressive power of the system. 
In the system of natural deduction N3~"~"~', the proposition ( P  > P )  3 ( P  > P )  has infinitely 
many inequivalent proofs (in fact, the Church numerals for P) .  On the other hand, in ~37'~"*"~', 
( P  > P) > ( P  > P )  only has finitely many proofs, and in fact only two, corresponding to  the 
Church numerals "zero" and "one". This is regrettable, but a cynic would not be surprised: there 
is no free lunch! 
The above considerations lead naturally to the following question: what is the exact relationship 
between cut-elimination and (strong) normalization in intuitionistic logic? In [37], Jeff Zucker 
makes an in-depth study of this relationship. Although Zucker obtains some very nice results in 
this formidable paper, he does not provide a complete answer to the problem. Intuitively, the reason 
is that the reduction relation induced by cut-elimination transformations is finer than P-reduction 
(as alluded to in section 10). Thus, the exact relationship between cut-elimination and (strong) 
normalization remains a challenging open problem. For the latest results, see Ungar [33]. 
A few more remarks about the role of contraction and weakening will be useful as a motivation 
for linear logic. We already noticed with the cut rule that contexts (the I?, A occurring in the 
premise(s) of inference rules) can be treated in two different ways: (1) either they are merged 
(which implies that they are identical), or (2) they are concatenated. 
In order to search for proof backwards, it is more convenient to treat contexts in mode (I), but 
this hides some subtleties. For example, the (A:  right) rule can be written either as 
where the contexts are merged, or as 
where the contexts are just concatenated but not merged. Following Girard, let's call the first 
version additive, and the second version multiplicative. Under contraction and weakening, the two 
versions are equivalent: the first rule can be simulated by the second rule using contractions: 
and the second rule can be simulated by the first rule using weakenings: 
Similarly, the (A: left) rules can be written either as 
Again, let's call the first version additive, and the second version multiplicative. These versions 
are equivalent under contraction and weakening. The first version can be simulated by the second 
rule using weakening: 
A , r F  A 
(weakening: left) 
and the second version can be simulated by the first rule and contraction: 
AA B ,A  A B , ~ F  A 
(contrac: le f t )  
A A B , I ' b  A 
If we take away contraction and weakening, the additive and multiplicative versions are no longer 
equivalent. This suggests, and this path was followed by Girard, t o  split the connectives A and 
V into two versions: the multiplicative version of A and V, denoted as 8 and k3, and the additive 
version of A and V, denoted as & and $. In linear logic, due to Girard [12], the connectives A and V 
are split into multiplicative and additive versions, contraction and weakening are dropped, negation 
denoted A'- is involutive, and in order to regain the loss of expressiveness due to  the absence of 
contraction and weakening, some new connectives (the exponentials ! and ?) are introduced. The 
main role of these connectives is to have better control over contraction and weakening. Thus, a t  
the heart of linear logic lies the notion that resources are taken into account. 
13 Reduct ions of Classical Logic to Intuitionist ic Logic 
Although there exist formulae that are provable classically but not intuitionistically, there are sev- 
eral ways of embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic. More specifically, there are functions 
* from formulae t o  formulae such that for every formula A, its translation A* is equivalent to  A 
classically, and A is provable classically iff A* is provable intuitionistically. Stronger results can be 
obtained in the propositional case. Since 1 1 A  > A is provable classically but not intuitionistically, 
whereas A > 1 7 A  is provable both classically and intuitionistically, we can expect that double- 
negation will play a crucial role, and this is indeed the case. One of the crucial properties is that 
triple negation is equivalent to a single negation. This is easily shown as follows (in G,?'~~"''): 
A t -  A 
Since we also have the following proof (in G;>'"'"") 
it is clear that 1 1 1 A  = 1 A is provable intuitionistically. 
The possibility of embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic is due to  four crucial facts 
which we show step by step: 
(1) 1 1 1 A  = 1 A  is provable intuitionistically; 
(2) If a formula A is provable classically without using the (V: right)-rule, then -nA is provable 
intuitionistically; 
(3) For a class of formulae for which 1-A I- A is provable intuitionistically, (2) holds unre- 
stricted. This means that if a formula A in this class is provable classically then 1-A is 
provable intuitionistically; 
(4) For every formula A built only from 3, A,  1 and V, if A = 11Pi > Pi,. . . , - 1 P k  3 P k  where 
P i , .  . . , Pk are all the atoms occurring in A, then A, i i A  I- A is provable intuitionistically. 
The "trick" of the double-negation translation (often attributed to  Godel (1933), although it 
was introduced independently by Kolmogorov (1925) and Gentzen (1933)) is that if we consider a 
formula A only built from 3 ,  A, 1, V, and replace every atomic subformula P by 11P obtaining At, 
we get a subclass of formulae for which (4) holds without the A,  and thus (3) also holds. For this 
class, A is provable classically iff A+ is provable intuitionistically. 
Our first result will concern propositions. Given r = A1,. . .,A,, let 1iI' = i i A 1 , .  . . , i i A m .  
Lemma 13.1 Given a sequent I' I- B1,. . . , B, of propositions, i f  I' I- B1,. . . , B, is provable in  
G,>J"'Vt', then 11I' I- l ( l B 1  A . . . A lB,)  is provable in  G ? ' ~ ' ~ " .  
Proof. We proceed by induction on proofs. In fact, it is easier to work in G > ' " ' ~ " ' ~ ~  and use cut 
elimination. It is necessary to prove that a number of propositions are provable intuitionistically. 
First, observe that if A1, . . . , Am I- B is provable in G " ~ ' " ' ~ ' ~ " ~  , then l l A l , .  . ., l l A ,  I- 1 1 B  is 
also provable in G,?'A'V"'Cut . The following sequents are provable in ~>'A'V"'cut: 
1 1 A  I- l ( 1 A  A D),  
7 ( l A  A D), l ( 1 B  A D )  t- 7 ( l ( A  A B)  A D), 
l l ( A  A B) I- 1 1 A  A l l B ,  
l ( 1 A  A 1 B  A D )  I- l ( l ( A  V B) A D), 
l l ( A  V B )  I- l ( 1 A  A l B ) ,  
(11A 3 l ( 1 B  A D)) I- +(A 3 B )  A D), 
l l ( A  3 B), l ( 1 A  A D) ,  ( 1 1 B  3 1 D )  I- l D ,  
(11A 3 1 D )  I- l ( 1 1 A  A D),  
l ( 1 A  A D),  1 1 1 A  k l D ,  
l ( 1 A  A 1 A  A D) I- l ( 1 A  A D). 
Given A = Dl , .  . . ,Dm,  we let D = l D 1  A . . . A l D m .  This way, observe that l ( 1 A  A l D 1  A .. . A  
lD,) = l ( 1 A  A D). The reader should be aware that the case where m = 0 in A = Dl , .  . . , D m  
can arise and requires special treatment. In this case, D can be considered t o  be 1 I. Actually, if 
we add I and the axioms I, I' I- A where A is either empty or a single formula to  G > ' " ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ,  then 
11 1-1 and A A -I I= A are provable, and we just have t o  simplify the above sequents accordingly. - 
We proceed assuming that m 2 1, leaving the case m = 0 to the reader. Now, consider the axioms 
and each inference rule. An axiom r ,  A I- A, A becomes i d ' ,  1-A I- -(-A A D ) ,  which is provable 
in ~',A,v,l,cut since 1-A I- l ( 1 A  A D)  is. Let us also consider the case of the (3:  right)-rule, 
leaving the others as exercises. 
I',AI- B , A  
By the induction hypothesis, 14?, 1 1 A  I- l ( 1  B A D)  is provable in G , ? ' ~ ' ~ " ' " ~ ~  , and so is 
17r I- (11A 3 l ( 1 B  A D)). 
Since 
(11A 3 l ( 1 B  A D))  I- +(A 3 B )  A D )  
is also provable in ~>'A'V"'cut, by a cut, we obtain that 
is provable in ~ ~ ' A ' V " ' c " t  , as desired. 
In order to  appreciate the value of Lemma 13.1, the reader should find a direct proof of 
l l ( l l P  3 P )  in G,?~"~"~'. 
Since 1 1 1 A  1 A  is provable intuitionistically, we obtain the following lemma known as 
Glivenko's Lemma. 
Lemma 13.2 [Glivenko, 19291 Given a sequent l r ,  A I- l B 1 , .  . . , l B ,  made of propositions, i f  
l r ,  A I- l B 1 , .  . . , l B ,  is provable in G2J"'V~', then 4 , ~ - A  I- l ( B 1  A . . . A B,) is provable i n  
G,?""~". In particular, if l r  I- 1 B  is a propositional sequent provable i n  B,>~A~V~', then it is  also 
provable in  G ? ' ~ ' ~ " .  
Proof. By Lemma 13.1, using the fact that 1 1 1 A  = 1 A  is provable intuitionistically, and that 
the sequent 
l ( 1 7 B l  A . . . A l l B , )  I- l ( B l  A . . . A  B,) 
is provable in G , ? ' ~ ' ~ " .  
As a consequence of Lemma. 13.1, if a proposition A is provable classically, then 1-A is provable 
intuitionistically, and as a consequence of Lemma 13.2, if a proposition 1 A  is provable classically, 
then it is also provable intuitionistically. It should be noted that Lemma 13.1 fails for quantified 
formulae. For example, Vx(P(x) V l P ( x ) )  is provable classically, but we can show that l l V x ( P ( x ) ~  
l P ( x ) )  is not provable intuitionistically, for instance using the system of Lemma 8.9. Similarly, 
V x l l P ( x )  > l l V x P ( x )  is provable classically, but it is not provable intuitionistically, and neither 
is ~ ~ ( V x ~ ~ P ( x )  > l l V x P ( x ) ) .  As observed by Godel, Lemma 13.2 has the following remarkable 
corollary. 
Lemma 13.3 [Godel, 19331 For every proposition A built only from A and -I, if A is provable 
classically, then A is also provable intuitio~zistically. 
Proof. By induction on A. If A = l B ,  then this follows by Glivenko's Lemma. Otherwise, 
it must be possible to write A = B1 A . . . A B, where each B; is not a conjunct and where each 
B; is provable classically. Thus, each B; must be of the form lC; ,  since if B; is an atom it is not 
provable. Again, each B; is provable intuitionistically by Glivenko's Lemma, and thus so is A. IJ 
Lemma 13.1 confirms that double-negation plays an important role in linking classical logic to  
intuitionistic logic. The following lemma shows that double-negation distributes over the connec- 
tives A and 3.  
Lemma 13.4 The following formulae are provable in G,?'"'"'': 
Proof. We give proofs for 
-(A 3 B) k- 1 1 A  3 1 1 B  
and 
l l A  > 1 7 B  I- l l ( A  3 B), 
leaving the others as exercises. 
A, -(A 3 B),  1 B  I- 
l l ( A  3 B), 1 B  I- 1 A  
- - - - - - 
-(A > B), l l A ,  1 B  I- 
l l ( A  > B), 1 1 A  I- 1 -B  
l A ,  A I- B , A +  B 
-A, A I- B B t - A > B  
1 A I - A >  B B , l ( A  3 B) I- 
i ( A  > B),  1 A  I- l ( A  > B) I- 1 B  
l ( A  > B )  I- 1 1 A  l l B ,  l ( A  > B) I- 
1 1 A  > l l B ,  l ( A  > B) I- 
Lemma 13.4 fails for disjunctions. For example, 
is not provable in ~ 3 ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ,  since l l ( P  V 1 P )  is provable but ( 1 1 P  V 1 1 1 P )  is not provable in 
G:'~'~" (this is easily shown using the system GK;). Lemma 13.4 also fails for the quantifiers. 
For example, using the system of Lemma 8.9, we can show that Vxl - tP(x)  > -~lVxP(x)  and 
1 1 3 2  P(x)  > 3 x 1 1  P ( x )  are not provable intuitionistically. 
Even though Lemma 13.1 fails in general, in particular for universal formulae, Kleene has made 
the remarkable observation that the culprit is precisely the (V: right)-rule [18] (see Theorem 59, 
page 492). Indeed, the lemma still holds for arbitrary sequents I' I- B1,. . . , B,, provided that their 
proofs in G 2 9 A v V 9 ' 9 v 7 3  do not use the rule (V: right). 
Lemma 13.5 Given a first-order sequent I' I- B1,. . ., B,, if I' I- Bl , .  . ., B, is provable i n  
~ ~ J " ' v * 1 ~ v ~ 3  without using the rule (i: right), then ill? I- 1 ( l B 1  A . . . A lB,)  is provable i n  
Gt?,A,v,-,V,3 
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 13.1, we proceed by induction on proofs. It is necessary to 
3,A,V,-,v,j. prove that the following sequents are provable in G, 
i ( i A [ t / x ]  A D )  I- i ( 1 3 x A  A D) ,  
Vx(1iA 3 i D ) ,  113xA I- i D ,  
( i i A [ t / x ]  3 i D ) ,  i i V x A  I- - I D .  
where x does not occur in D in the second sequent. Proofs for the above sequents follow: 
l ( l A [ t / x ]  A D),  73xA, D I- 
-~( iA[ t /x ]  A D) ,  i 3 x A  A D I- 
where x does not occur in D,  and y is a new variable. 
We now have to consider the cases where the last inference is one of (V: left), (3: left), or (3: 
right). We treat the case of the rule (3: right), leaving the others as exercises. 
Given A = Dl , .  .. , D m ,  we let D = l D 1  A . . . A -ID,. The reader should be aware that the 
case where m = 0 in A = Dl, .  . . , D m  can arise and requires special treatment (as in the proof of 
Lemma 13.1). We proceed with the case where m 2 1, leaving the case m = 0 to  the reader. By 
the induction hypothesis, 14' I- i ( lA[ t /x ]  A D) is provable in B > ' " ~ ~ " ' ~ ' ~ .  On the other hand, 
since the sequent 
i ( i A [ t / x ]  A D) I- ~ ( 1 3 x A  A D )  
is provable in using a cut, we obtain that the sequent 
is provable in ~>,A 'V1"v73,  as desired. 
Technically, the problem with Lemma 13.5, is that the sequent 
(where x does not occur in D )  is not provable in In order to  see where the problem 
really lies, we attempt t o  construct a proof of this sequent. 
l ( l A [ ~ l ~ l  A Dl,  D I- A[ylxI 
V x i ( i A  A D),  D I- A[y/x] 
Vx i ( iA  A D),  D I- VxA 
Vxl(1A A D), iVxA, D t- 
Vx i ( iA  A D),  iVxA A D I- 
Vx i ( iA  A D) I- i ( iVxA A D )  
where x does not occur in D ,  and y is a new variable. The problem is that we cannot apply the (V: 
left)-rule before 1VxA has been transferred to the righthand side of the sequent (as VxA) and before 
the (V: right)-rule has been applied to  VxA, since this would violate the eigenvariable condition. 
Unfortunately, we are stuck with the sequent i ( iA[y /x ]  A D) ,  D I- A[y/x] which is unprovable in 
G ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ .  However, note that the sequent i ( iA[y /x ]  A D), D I- -~lA[y/x]  in which A[y/x] has 
been replaced with l i A [ y / x ]  is provable in c : ' " ' ~ '~ '~ '~ :  
~ ( ~ A [ Y / x I  A D), D ,- l l A [ ~ l ~ l  
Thus, if the sequent i l A  I- A was provable in G : ~ " ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ,  the sequent
would also be provable in It is therefore important to  identify a subclass of first- 
order formulae for which i l A  I- A is provable in 6~'"'V"'v"3, since for such a class, Lemma 13.5 
holds without restrictions. The following lemma showing the importance of the axiom 11P I- P 
where P is atomic, leads us to such a class of formulae. It is at the heart of the many so-called 
"double-negation translations". 
Lemma 13.6 For every formula A built only from 3, A, i , V ,  the sequent 1 i A  I- A is provable in 
the system ~ 2 " ' ~ "  obtained from G:'"'~" by adding all sequents of the form T-IP, r I- P where P 
is atomic as axioms. In the propositional case, if A = 11 PI > PI, . . . , -1 Pk > Pk where PI, . . . , Pk 
are all the atoms occurring in A, then A, 1-A t- A is provable in G>'"". 
Proof. It proceeds by induction on the structure of A. If A is an atom P, this is obvious 
since i7P I- P is an axiom. If A = B A C, by the induction hypothesis, both TTB I- B and 
11C I- C are provable in ~z:;".~", and so is 1 1 B  A - iC I- B A C. We just have to  prove that 
l T ( B  A C )  I- 11B A 1 4 7  is provable in G,?'""'V, which is easily done. If A = l B ,  since we have 
shown that 7 l l B  I- 1B  is provable in G?'""", so is 1-A I- A. If A = B > C, then by the 
induction hypothesis, 11C I- C is provable in ~2""" (and so is - I -B I- B, but we won't need it). 
Observe that the sequent 14' 3 C, l l ( B  > C) I- B 3 C is provable in G?'""": 
i i ( B  2 C), B ,  1 C  I- 
1-(B > C), B t- 14' l i ( B  I) C), B, C I- C 
142  3 C, l i ( B  3 C), B I- C 
Using the fact that 1 1 C  I- C is provable in G$A'l" and a suitable cut, ~ - I ( B  > C) I- B 3 C 
is provable in F ~ : ; " ' ~ ' ~ .  If A = VxB, we can show easily that 11VxB I- -~ lB[ t /x ]  is provable 
in A v .  Since by the induction hypothesis, 1 i B  I- B is provable in c$'""", for any new 
variable y, l l B [ y / x ]  I- B[y/x] is also provable in E $ " ' ~ ' ~ ,  and thus by choosing t = g, the sequent 
11VxB I- B[y/x] is provable where y is new, so that TTVXB I- VxB is provable in c ~ " ' ~ ' ~ .  
Unfortunately, Lemma 13.6 fails for disjunctions and existential quantifiers. For example, 
11P 3 PI- l l ( P  v 1 P )  3 ( P  v 1 P )  
is not provable in ~~ 'A 'v7 ' "3 .  This can be shown as follows. Since P v 1P is provable in G ~ ~ A i v ~ l ,  
by Lemma 13.1, ~ ~ ( P v T P )  is provable in ~3':;"'~". Thus, 11P > P I- ( P v - I P )  would be provable 
in G~9A~V1'*v93, but we can show using the system of Lemma 8.9 that this is not so. 
The sequent 
11P 3 PI- 11(113xP(x)  3 3z11P(x) )  3 (113xP(x)  3 3 ~ 7 7 P ( ~ ) )  
is also not provable in This is because (1-3xP(x) 3 3 x l l P ( x ) )  is provable in 
6,>J"'V3'lv93 without using the (V: right)-rule, and so, by Lemma 1 3 . 5 , 1 ~ ( 1 1 3 x P ( x )  > 3 z l l P ( x ) )  
is provable in (,7~7"'V"'V73. Then, 
11P > Pt- (113xP(x)  3 3x71P(x))  
would be provable in 43'A'V"'v'3, but we can show using the system of Lemma 8.9 that this is not 
so. 
Since the sequent A V -A I- 1 1 A  3 A is easily shown to be provable in G?~"'""'~'~ , Lemma 
13.6 also holds with the axioms I? I- P V i P  substituted for l i p ,  I' I- P (for all atoms P ) .  In fact, 
with such axioms, we can even show that Lemma 13.6 holds for disjunctions (but not for existential 
formulae). 
In view of Lemma 13.6 we can define the following function t on formulae built from > , A ,  1 , V :  
A~ = l i A ,  if A is atomic, 
( 1 ~ ) ~  = T A ~ ,  
(A * B ) ~  = (A+ * B ~ ) ,  if * E {>,A}, 
( V X A ) ~  = V X A ~ .  
Given a formula built only from 2 ,  A, l , V ,  the function t simply replaces every atom P by 11P. It 
is easy to show that A and ~t are classically equivalent. The following lemma shows the significance 
of this function. 
Lemma 13.7 For every formula A built only from >, A,  - I ,  V, the sequent 1 1 ~ ~  I- A+ is provable 
in  the system G , ? ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ .  
Proof. Since i - ~ i A  E 1 A  is provable in G?'""", the sequent 1 i l i P  = T-IP is provable in 
G?~"" '~  for every atom P ,  and thus the result follows from the definition of At and Lemma 13.6. 
C1 
Actually, we can state a slightly more general version of Lemma 13.7, based on the observation 
that 1 1 1 A  - -A is provable in  G ~ ' " " ' ~ .  
Lemma 13.8 For every formula A built only from 3, A ,  1 , V  and where every atomic subformula 
occurs negated (except I), the sequent 1 1 A  I- A is provable in the system G?'""". 
The formulae of the kind mentioned in Lemma 13.8 are called negative formulae. The following 
lemma shows that if we use double-negation, then V, 3 ,  and 3 are definable intuitionistically from 
the connectives A, 1 ,  V. 
Lemma 13.9 The following formulae are provable in  G?'""": 
l l ( A  V B)  5 l ( 1 A A  l B ) ,  
-173xA lVx iA ,  
l ( A  A 1 B )  = -(A 3 B). 
Proof. We give a proof of the sequents i i 3 x A  I- 1Vx -A and l ( A  A 1 B )  I- l l ( A  2 B), leaving 
the others as exercises. 
where y is a new variable, 
A , B I - A 3 B  
7(A > B), A, B I- 
l ( A  3 B),AI-  A -(A 2 B),AI- i B  
i ( A >  B ) , A I - A h - B  
'(A A l B ) , l ( A  2 B),A t- 
l ( A  A l B ) , l ( A  > B),AI-  B 
-(A A l B ) ,  l ( A  3 B), l ( A  3 B)  I- 
We are now ready to  prove the main lemma about the double-negation translation. The cor- 
rectness of many embeddings of classical logic into intuitionistic logic follows from this lemma, 
including those due t o  Kolmogorov, Godel, and Gentzen. 
Lemma 13.10 Let r I- B1,. . . , B, be any first-order sequent containing formulae made only from 
3, A, 1, and V. If r I- B1,. . . , B, is provable in 62J"'V9'1v93 then its translation I't I- ~ ( T B :  h . . . h 
- I B ~ )  is provable in ~,?'""". In particular, if B is provable in G,>J"'v9'~v93, then ~t is provable in 
Proof. First, we prove that if r I- B1,. . . , B, is provable in ~ , > 9 " 9 ~ ~ ' 3 ' 1 ~  then I't I- B!, . . . , BL 
is also provable in G',>J"'V~'~v93. This is done by a simple induction on proofs. Next, we prove that 
l l r t  I- ~ ( T B ;  h . . . TB:) is provable in G~'~' ' ' ' .  The only obstacle to  Lemma 13.5 is the use of 
the (V: right)-rule. However, we have seen in the discussion following Lemma 13.5 that the problem 
is overcome for formulae such that -1A I- A is provable in 6~'""". But this is the case by Lemma 
13.7 (which itself is a direct consequence of Lemma 13.6), since we are now considering formulae 
of the form ~ t .  Since B I- 1 1 B  is provable in G?'",~'' for any B,  using cuts on the premises in 
14?, we obtain a proof of I't I- ~ ( 1 ~ 1  A . . . A 1 ~ : )  in 6,?'""". In the special case where n = 1 
and is empty, we have shown that I- T--IB+ is provable in G,?'""", and using Lemma 13.7, we 
obtain that ~t is provable in 6:'""". 
It is trivial that the converse of Lemma 13.10 holds (since 6~'""" is a subsystem of ~ , > 9 " 1 " 9 ' * ~ ~ )  
(and using the fact that A~ is classically equivalent to  A). As a corollary of Lemma 13.10, observe 
that for negative formulae (defined in Lemma 13.8), A is provable in ~ , > 1 " ~ ' ~ ~  iff A is provable in 
~ ~ " ' " ' .  This is because for a negative formula A, all atoms appears negated, and thus A z ~t 
is provable in 6~'""". 
We now define several translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic. 
Definition 13.1 1 The function O (due to  Gentzen) is defined as follows: 
A" = l l A ,  if A is atomic, 
(1A)O = 1A0)  
(A A B)O = (A0 A BO), 
(A > B)" = (A0 3 BO), 
(A V B)O = i ( l A O  A 1 B 0 ) ,  
(QxA)' = VxAO, 
(3xA)O = 1QxiA0.  
The function * (due to  Godel) is defined as follows: 
A* = l l A ,  if A is atomic, 
( lA)*  = l A * ,  
(A A B)* = (A* A B*), 
(A 3 B)* = l (A*  A l B * ) ,  
(A V B)* = i ( l A *  A i B * ) ,  
(QxA)* = QxA*, 
(3xA)* = lQx iA* .  
The function " (due to Kolmogorov) is defined as follows: 
A" = --A, if A is atomic, 
(1A)K = ,AK, 
(A A = l l ( A K  A BK) ,  
(A 3 B)" = +AK > BK), 
(A V B)" = 1 l ( A K  V B"), 
(QxA)" = 1 i Q x A K 1  
(3xA)% = -1i3xA". 
Since all atoms are negated twice in A', A*, and An, we can use Lemma 13.6 t o  show that 
A0 = 11A0 ,  A' z TTA*, and A" = T-IA" are provable in G>'""". Then, using this fact and 
Lemma 13.9, we can show by induction on formulae that A0 = A*, A* r An, and A'( = A0 are 
provable in G?'""". Consequently, for any sequent T I- B1,. . . , B,, the sequent 
is provable in G>'""'~ iff 
r'* I- l ( 1B ;  A . .  . A 1B;) 
is provable in G:'""'~ iff 
rK I- l (1BT A . .  . A 1BZ) 
is provable. Furthermore, it is easily shown that A = A', A = A*, and A = A'(, are provable 
classically. 
T h e o r e m  13.12 For any sequent I? I- B1, . . . , B,, if I' I- Bl, . . . , B, is provable in G29"7Vp'!v13, 
then the sequents r0 I- l ( l B y  A. .  . A l B i ) ,  I?* I- l ( 1 B ;  A . .  .A l B i ) ,  and rK I- l ( 1 B f  A . .  .ATBE), 
are provable in G?'""". In particular, if A is provable in G 2 q " 9 V 9 ' ~ v 7 3 ,  then A', A*, and AK, are 
provable in (7,?'""". 
Proof. We simply have to  observe that the translation O is in fact the composition of two 
functions: the first one is defined as in Definition 13.11, except that atoms remain unchanged, 
and the second function is just t .  This translation has the property that A* only contains the 
connectives >, A, 1, and V. Furthermore, it is easily shown that I? B1,. . . , B, is provable in 
Gc>~A*V~'9v~3 iff I- By,. . . , BE is (because A A* is easily provable in (727"7V9'9v93). Therefore, 
Lemma 13.10 applies to I'* I- By, . . . , BE, and we obtain the desired result. 
It is trivial that the converse of Theorem 13.12 holds. 
We shall now discuss another translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic due to  Gi- 
rard [14]. Girard has pointed out that the usual double-negation translations have some rather 
undesirable properties: 
(1) They are not compatible with substitution. Indeed, the translation A[B/P]* of A[B/P] is 
not equal to  A*[B*/P] in general, due to  the application of double negations to  atoms. 
(2) Negation is not involutive. For instance, A[B/P]* and A*[B*/P] are related through the 
erasing of certain double negations (passing from 111P to l P ) ,  but this erasing is not harmless. 
(3) Disjunction is not associative. For example, if A V B is translated as l ( 1 A  A l B ) ,  then 
(A V B)  V C is translated as l ( l ( l ( 1 A  A 1 B ) )  A l C ) ,  and A V ( B  V C) is translated as l ( 1 A  A 
l ( l ( 1 B  A 1C))) .  
Girard has discovered a translation which does not suffer from these defects, and this translation 
also turns out to  be quite economical in the number of negation signs introduced [14]. The main 
idea is to  assign a sign or polarity (+ or -) to every formula. Roughly speaking, a positive literal 
P (where P is an atom) is a formula of polarity +, a negative literal 1P is a formula of polarity 
-, and to  determine the polarity of a compound formula, we combine its polarities as if they were 
truth values, except that $ corresponds to false, - corresponds to  t r u e ,  existential formulae are 
always positive, and universal formulae are always negative. Given a sequent r I- A, the idea is 
that right-rules have to be converted to left-rules, and in order to do this we need to  move formulae 
in A to  the lefthand side of the sequent. The new twist is that formulae in A will be treated 
differently according to their polarity. One of the key properties of polarities is that every formula 
A of polarity - turns out to be equivalent to a formula of the form 1 B  with B of polarity +. Then 
every formula A - 1 B  in A of polarity - will be transferred to  the lefthand side as B (and not as 
l l B ) ,  and every formula A in A of polarity + will be transferred t o  the lefthand side as -A. The 
translation is then completely determined if we add the obvious requirement that the translation of 
a classically provable sequent should be intuitionistically provable, and that it should be as simple 
as possible. Let us consider some typical cases. 
Case 1. The last inference is 
I? I- i C ,  1 D  
where C and D are positive. The sequent I' I- lC ,  1 D  is translated as r, C, D I-, and we have the 
inference 
It is thus natural t o  translate 1C V 1 D  as l ( C  A D), since then C A D  will be placed on the lefthand 
side (because l ( C  A D )  is negative). 
Case 2. The  last inference is 
where C and D are positive. The sequent r I- C ,  D is translated as r, lC,  1 D  I-, and we have the  
inference 
r , l c , l ~  I- 
This time, the simplest thing to  do is t o  translate C V D as C V D (since C V D is positive), so 
that l ( C  V D )  is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. This is indeed legitimate because 
l ( C  V D )  = -IC A 1 D  is provable intuitionistically. 
Case 3. The last inference is 
where C is positive. The sequent r I- C[y/x] is translated as I', lC[y /x ]  I-, and we have the 
inference 
r, ~ C [ Y / X I  I- 
We translate VxC as 1 3 x l C ,  so that 3 x l C  is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. 
Case 4. The last inference is 
r I- ~ C [ Y / X I  
where C is positive. The sequent r I- lC[y /x ]  is translated as I',C[y/x] I-, and we have the 
inference 
We translate V x l C  as d x C ,  so that 3xC is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent 
Case 5. The last inference is 
r ,- C [ ~ / X ]  
r I- 3xC 
where C is positive. The sequent r I- C[t/x] is translated as I', l C [ t / x ]  I-, and we have the 
inference 
The simplest thing to  do is to translate 3xC as 3xC, so that 13xC is placed on the lefthand side 
of the sequent. This is possible because 13xC - Vx lC  is provable intuitionistically. 
Case 6. The last inference is 
where C  is positive. The sequent r I- l C [ t / x ]  is translated as r ,  C[ t /x]  I-. The simplest thing to  
do is to  translate 3x iC as 3x lC ,  so that 13x iC is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. 
This is possible because 1 3 x 4 '  = V x l i C  is provable intuitionistically, and we have the sequence 
of inferences 
Note that it was necessary to first double-negate C[ t / x ] .  This is because 13x-1C V X T - I C  is
provable intuitionistically, but 13x-C = VzC is not. 
Case 7 .  The last inference is 
T I - C  r F D  
I'I-CAD 
where C ,  D  are positive. The sequents r  I- C  and I- D  are translated as r ,  - I C  I- and r ,  1 D  I-. 
Since C  A D is positive, the simplest thing to do is to translate C  A D  as C  A D, so that i ( C  A D)  is 
placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. This is possible because i ( i i C  A i i D )  = l ( C  A D)  
is provable intuitionistically, and we have the sequence of inferences 
I', l ( l 1 C  A 11D)  b- 
Case 8. The last inference is 
1 r P  D  
where C ,  D  are positive. The sequents r ,- 4' and I' I- D  are translated as r ,  C  I- and I?, i D  I-. 
Since 1CA D  is positive, the simplest thing to do is to translate 1CA D  as i C A  D, so that T ( T C A  D )  
is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. This is possible because l ( 1 C  A 1 1 D )  = l ( 1 C  A D )  
is provable intuitionistically, and we have the sequence of inferences 
Case 9. The last inference is 
I ' I - i C  F I - T D  
re 1 C A l D  
where C ,  D are positive. The sequents r I- 1 C  and r I- 1 D  are translated as r, C I- and I', D I-, 
and we have the inference 
I',CI- ~ , D I -  
I ' ,CVDI-  
We translate - I C  A 1 D  as l ( C  V D),  so that C V D is placed on the lefthand side of the sequent. 
Considering all the cases, we arrive at the following tables defining the Girard-translation Â  of 
a formula. 
Definition 13.13 Given any formula A, its sign (polarity) and its Girard-translation 2 are given 
by the following tables: 
If A = P where P is an atom, including the constants T ( t rue)  and I (false), then sign(A) = + 
and 2 = A, and if A is a compound formula then 2 is given by the following tables: 
Girard's 11-Translation 
In order to state the main property of the Girard-translation, we need one more definition. 
Given a formula A, we define its translation as follows: 
A 
+, C 
+, C 
-, 4' 
-,TC 
Girard's 11-Translation 
- A = {  12 if sign(A) = +, 
A 
B if sign(A) = - and A = 1 B .  
- 
Given A = B 1 , .  . ., B,, we let = z,. . ., B,. Then, a sequent I' I- A is translated into the 
sequent r ,  I-. 
B 
+, D 
-, 1 D  
+ I D  
- , l D  
A 
f , C  
-, lc 
We have the following theorem due du Girard [14]. 
3xA 
+, 3xC 
+, 321C 
Vx A 
-, 1 3 x l C  
-, 13xC 
Theorem 13.14 Given any sequent I' I- A,  if I' I- A is provable classically (in ~ , > 7 " ~ " 7 ' ~ ~ 7 ~ ) ,  then 
its translation r ,  h I- is provable intuitionistically (in G > ' " ' ~ " ' ~ ' ~  1. 
1 A  
-)  -6' 
+, c 
A > B  
-, -I(C A 1 D )  
-, l ( C  A D)  
+ , C V D  
- , i ( i C A D )  
A A B  
+ , C A D  
+ , C A i D  
+ , i C A D  
- , l ( C v D )  
A V B  
+ , C V D  
-, i ( 1 C  A D)  
-, i ( C  A 1 D )  
- , i ( C A D )  
Proof. By induction on the structure of proofs. We have already considered a number of cases 
in the discussion leading to  the tables of Definition 13.13. As an auxiliary result, we need to show 
that the following formulae are provable intuitionistically (in fact, the top four follow from lemma 
13.4, lemma 13.9, and the fact that 11-A = TA is provable intuitionistically): 
l ( C  v D)  = 1 C  A i D ,  
l ( l i C  A 1 1 D )  = i ( C  A D),  
l ( 1 C  A 1 1 D )  = l ( 1 C  A D), 
- ~ ( i i C  A i D )  = i ( C  A l D ) ,  
i 3 x C  = VxiC, 
i 3 2 1 C  = V x i l C .  
We leave the remaining cases as an exercise. 
Observe that a formula A of any polarity can be made into an equivalent formula of polarity 
+, namely A+ = A A T ,  or an equivalent formula of polarity -, namely A- = A V - IT.  The 
Girard-translation has some nice properties, and the following lemma lists some of them [14]. 
Lemma 13.15 The translation A tt Â  given in Definition 13.13 is compatible with substitutions 
respecting polarities. Furthermore, it satisfies a number of remarkable identities ( in the equivalences 
below, it is assumed that we are considering the Girard-translations of the formulae involved. For - 
example, in (i), we really mean 1 1 A  = Â . To unclutter the notation, hats will be omitted): 
(i) Negation is involutive: i l A  = A. 
(ii) De Morgan identities: l ( A  A B )  = -A V 1 B ;  l ( A  V B )  = 1 A  A 1 B ;  A > B = 1 A  V B; 
i V x A  3 x i A ;  i 3 x A  VxiA. 
(iii) Associativity of ' A  and V ;  as a consequence, ( A  A B) > C = A > ( B  > C), and A > 
( B  V C) = ( A  > B) V C .  
(iv) Neutrality identities: A V I == A; A A 1 I = A. 
(v)  Commutativity of A and V (as a consequence, A > B = i B  > i A ) .  
(vi) Distributivity identities with restriction on polarities: A A ( P  V Q) = ( A  A P )  V ( A  A Q ) ;  
A v (L A M )  G ( A  v L )  A (A v M) (where P, Q are positive, and L, M negative). 
(vii) Idempotency identities: P+ z P where P is positive; N -  = N where N is negative; as a 
consequence, A++ A+ and A-- = A- .  
(viii) Quantifier isomorphisms: A A 3 x P  = 3x(A A P) if x is not free in  A and P is positive; 
A V V x N  = Vx(A V N) i f  x is not free in A and N is negative. 
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward, but somewhat tedious. Because of the polarities, 
many cases have to  be considered. Some cases are checked in Girard [14], and the others can be 
easily verified. 
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